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This study was undertaken to investigate the need to
increase competition at the subcontract level in Govern-
ment acquisition. Current Government acquisition policies
include the preference for competitive subcontracting*, It
was recognized that approximately 50% of all Government
acauisition dollars go to subcontractors and that effective
competition at that level is necessary to ensure that the
Government is receiving quality items at the best prices.
In investigating the nature of competitive subcontract-
ing, interviews were conducted with Government, prime con-
tractor, and subcontractor personnel. Areas covered in
these interviews included the amount of competitive sub-
contracting, competitive practices and policies of each
participant, and problems encountered in attempting to
achieve competition.
The results of this study include: the current extent
of competitive subcontracting is unknown; there are many
pressures working against competition; although the Govern-
ment has procedures and policies regarding competition they
do not always work; and, the need to increase competition
cannot be determined without further research. It is
recommended that a reporting system be developed to monitor
the amount of competitive subcontracting and that a manda-
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A. OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH
The Government depends on prime contractors to make and
administer subcontracts* It has no direct control or
privity of contract with these subcontractors. Since ap-
proximately 30% of all Government procurement dollars result
in subcontracts there is great concern throughout Government
over the manner in which subcontracts are awarded. The
Government policy on procurement is that it will be accom-
plished on a competitive basis to the maximum extent practi-
cable. Competitive procurement is believed to result in the
lowest price and best product. This idea also extends to the
subcontracting efforts. The purpose of this study is to
investigate the nature of competition at the subcontract
level in Government acquisition and to analyze methods for
potentially improving or increasing this competition.
B. RESEARCH QUESTION
In order to fully explore the nature of competition at
the subcontract level, it is necessary to answer several
questions: What is competition? What are the Government's
policies toward competition at the subcontract level? What
is the current nature of competition at the subcontract
level? How are the Government, prime contractors, and sub-
contractors influencing the degree of competition currently
being achieved? What problems do they encounter? What can
8

the Government do to increase competition at the subcontract
level?
C. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS
Since approximately 75% £~~5hJo£ Government acquisition
dollars are spent by the Department of Defense (DOD), this
study is essentially limited to DOD acquisitions of mater-
ial, equipment, and systems, both major and less than major*
Further, the study does not consider such concerns as
Foreign Military Sales, foreign procurement, subcontracts
beyond the first tier, or service contracts. This is not
to imply that none of the observations provided herein can
be considered applicable to such cases, but only that data
was not collected to support such conclusions.
D. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The data expounded upon in this study were collected
through an examination of acquisition literature at the
Naval Postgraduate School Library, the Defense Logistics
Studies Information Exchange, and the Defense Documenta-
tion Center; personal interviews with Government officials
at organizations such as the Office of Federal Procurement
Policy (OFPP), Office of the Secretary of Defense, various
military systems commands and project offices, and local
purchasing offices; personal interviews were conducted at
private industries such as General Dynamics, Rockwell Inter-
national, Hughes Aircraft, TRW, Garrett Air Research Cor-
poration, and Sargent Industries; and telephone interviews
were conducted in cases where appropriate personnel could

not be personally contacted. The majority of the data in
Chapter IV was collected during personal interviews.
Questions were developed for Government, prime contractors,
and subcontractors prior to research and are included in
Appendix A.
E. ASSUMPTIONS
Throughout the report it is assumed that the reader is
knowledgeable of standard DOD contracting terminology,
procedures, and concepts, as well as the structure of the
Federal acquisition policy-making system,
F. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Literature available in the area of competitive sub-
contracting is limited to references in Government regula-
tions such as the Defense Acquisition Regulations (DAR)
and Government sponsored studies and theses such as "Sub-
contracting Policy in Major Systems Acquisitions." Most
literature concerned with competition centered on competi-
tion between the Government and the prime contractor. Sub-
contracting literature included only vague references to
competition. A key deficiency in the literature was the
lack of statistics and actual cases concerning competitive
subcontracting.
G. DEFINITION OF A SUBCONTRACT
A review of the literature revealed a number of defini-
tions of a subcontract and subcontractor. DAR defines a
subcontract as "any contract as defined in 1-201 .if other
10

than a prime contract, entered into by a prime contractor or
a subcontractor, calling for supplies or services required
for the performance of any one or more prime contracts,
^"7:8-101 mZkJ BAR defines subcontractor as "any supplier,
distributor, vendor or firm which furnishes supplies or
services to or for a prime contractor or another subcontrac-
tor." £"7 :1 4-001 ,5_7 More complete definitions of subcon-
tract and subcontractor were published by the Department of
Labor's Office of Federal Contract Compliance and will be
the definitions applicable throughout this paper.
The term subcontract means any agreement or arrangement
between a contractor and any person (.in which the parties
do not stand in the relationship of an employer and em-
ployee;
(1; for the furnishing of supplies or services or
for the use of real or personal property, including
lease arrangements, which,in whole or in part, is
necessary to the performance of any one or more con-
tracts; or
(2) under which any portion of the contractor's
obligation under any one or more contracts is per-
formed, undertaken, or assumed.
The term subcontractor means any person holding a sub-
contract and,,,, any person who has held a subcontract
subject to the order. The term first tier subcontractor
refers to a subcontractor holding a subcontract with a
prime contractor. £~2.9:kk9_7
H. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
This study consists of several related topical dis-
cussions. Chapter II describes the concept of competition,
the Government acquisition process, and the relationship
between the Government prime contractor and subcontractor.
Chapter III describes the concern being expressed about
11

competition, the objectives of the Government and its con-
tractors in acquisition, the benefits of competition, and
current Government programs and policies which affect com-
petition at the subcontract level. Chapter IV presents the
results of interviews conducted with various contracting
and policy personnel and an analysis of these results.
Chapter V presents the conclusions and recommendations






Competition is defined in Webster's New Collegiate
Dictionary as "the effort of two or more parties, acting
independently, to secure the custom of a third party by
offering most favorable terms. The general definition of
competition used by the Department of Defense (DOD) is:
An environment of varying dimensions relating to buy-sell
relationships in which the buyer induces, stimulates, or
relies on conditions in the marketplace that causes inde-
pendent sellers to contend confidently for the award of a
contract./ 5:1A-B3__7
This definition, although broad enough to encompass
many types of competition, is too general to be used on a
working basis. The most specific working definition of
competition as used in Defense acquisition is contained in
the Defense Acquisition Regulations under the subject of
competition.
Price competition exists if offers are solicited and
(i) at least two responsible offerors, (ii) who can
satisfy the requirements, (iii) independently contend for
a contract to be awarded to the responsive and respon-
sible offeror submitting the lowest evaluated price,
(iv) by submitting price offers responsive to the ex-
pressed requirements of the solicitation. Whether there
is price competition for a given procurement is a matter
of judgment to be based on evaluation of whether each
of the foregoing conditions is satisfied. Generally, in
making this judgement, the smaller the number of offer-
ors, the greater the need for close evaluation. /_ 7:3-
807. 7
J
The DAR goes on to say that even if the above conditions
are met, there are some circumstances under which competi-
tion is still not present. Price competition is assumed to
13

be adequate unless it is determined that:
(i) the solicitation was made under conditions that un-
reasonably deny to one or more known and qualified offer-
ors an opportunity to compete;
(ii) the low competitor has such a determinative advan-
tage over the other competitors that he is practically
immune to the stimulus of competition in proposing a
price (e.g., a determinative advantage because substan-
tial costs, such as start up or other nonrecurring ex-
penses, have already been absorbed in connection with
previous sales, thus placing the competitor in a pre-
.
ferential position); or
(iii) the lowest final price is not reasonable and this
finding is supported by an enumeration of the facts upon
which it is based; provided, that such a finding is
approved at a level above the contracting officer.
/7: 3-807.1J
The DAR definition of price competition will be the
basis upon which the term competition will be discussed in
this study.
B. GOVERNMENT POLICY ON COMPETITION
The Government policy on competition is that it is the
preferred method of acquisition. The preference for com-
petitive procurement is demonstrated by the requirement to
use the formal advertising method for solicitations. DAP
states:
Purchases and contracts for supplies and services shall
be made by formal advertising in all cases in which the
use of such method is feasible and practicable under the
existing conditions and circumstances. LI' 1-300. 2_/
This formal advertising method provides unlimited oppor-
tunity to any potential bidder to make a proposal on the
solicitation and therefore is a competitive practice.
Even in situations where formal advertising is imprac-
tical, the Government requires the use of competition.
DAR goes further to state:
14

All procurements, whether by formal advertising or by-
negotiation, shall be made on_a competitive basis to the
maximum practicable extent, / 7:1 -300.1
__/
Since subcontract dollars are a significant portion of
the cost of many acquisitions, the Government also has a
definite policy on the use of competition by its prime con-
tractors in making subcontracts for Government prime con-
tracts. DAR states that all subcontractors shall be select-
ed "on a competitive basis to the maximum extent possible"
in negotiated prime contracts over $1 0,000. / 7:10if.ZfO_/
C. THE GOVERNMENT-PRIME CONTRACTOR-SUBCONTRACTOR RELATION-
SHIP
The Government is bound to the prime contractor by the
terms of a contract. A contract is an agreement for the
procurement of supplies or services, enforceable by lav/,
between two or more competent parties, to do or not do
something not prohibited by law, for a legal consideration.
l_ 5:1A-B^._7 The prime contractor may, in his own right,
award a subcontract to another firm in order to fulfill
the prime contractor's obligation to the Government. The
Government has a legal right as to the performance of the
prime contract and the prime contractor has a legal right
over the subcontractor as to the performance of the sub-
contract. The Government, however, does not have any legal
authority over the subcontractor in the performance of a
subcontract under a Government prime contract. The barrier
between the Government and the subcontractor is known as
the "wall of privity." /~29:^56_7
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The only control the Government has over the subcon-
tractor is the control exercised over the prime contractor
through the terms of the prime contract. The Government
makes prime contracts to achieve its contractural aims and,
if there are to be subcontractors, their choice and control
is normally up to the prime contractor. Subcontract prob-
lems, though, may have significant impact on cost, schedule,
and performance, therefore in some instances the Govern-
ment retains the right to "review" the prime contractor's
decisions in connection with make-or-buy programs or de-
cisions. These reviews and subsequent consents or denials
are not considered as legal approvals however, and give no
basis for subcontractor appeal to the Government. A sub-
contractor further has no contractual rights against the
Government upon the termination of a prime contract, only
against the prime contractor or intermediate subcontractor
with whom he has contracted. £~7 -8-2.09.} J/
In some contracts the Government requires the prime
contractor to "flow down" certain prime contract provisions
to his subcontractors. These flow down provisions, when
entered in the subcontract, still do not establish a rela-
tionship between the Government and the subcontractor.
In summary, the Government's contractual rights extend
only as far as the terms of the prime contract and only to
the prime contractor. There is no direct relationship
between the Government and the subcontractor and any com-
munication or other dealings concerned with a specific sub-
contract under a Government prime contract should take
16

place through the prime contractor,
D. THE GOVERNMENT ACQUISITION PROCESS
The Government's acquisition process, as related to
subcontracting, can be divided into two distinct phases;
preaward and postaward activities. It is during these two
phases that the Government must take steps to ensure that
its prime contractors are achieving the goal of competitive
subcontracting. The primary areas where the Government can
influence competition are through the source selection pro-
cess in the preaward phase and during contract administra-
tion in the post award phase.
The preaward phase of the acquisition process begins
with the identification of a requirement or need. In most
cases, the requirement can be specifically identified by
the user using established standards or specifications.
This identification normally is applicable to items which
have been in production for some time. In other cases,
there may not be established specifications or standards
and development of a new item may be required. It is im-
portant that the user and the procuring activity agree
exactly on what is required when preparing to acquire an
item or service. This calls for planning, communication,
and cooperation between the user and the purchasing activ-
ity. This coordination normally begins with an acquisition
plan which outlines the requirements and steps to be taken
in the process. In major system acquisitions this plan is
developed in the system's project office. This project
17

office consists of a staff dedicated to the development of
the specific system under the direction of a project manager.
The staff consists of personnel from several functional
areas including contracting, engineering, quality assurance,
finance, and any other expertise deemed necessary by the
project manager for the successful completion of the pro-
ject. In the local purchasing activities, the staff is not
specialized for a single acquisition or type of item, but
handles a wide spectrum of requirements which do not qualify
for major systems procedures.
Identification of the requirement is an activity which
is quite different between local purchasing activities and
major systems acquisitions. Local purchasing activities
normally rely on the user activity to specifically identify
a requirement. In major systems, however, there is a process
to identify the mission need vice a specific requirement.
OMB Circular A- 109 expressed the concern of the Commission
on Government Procurement over the effectiveness of the
management of major systems acquisitions. In order to
improve the acquisition process, A-109 directed that all
major system acquisition programs would develop and use
solicitations based on mission need rather than speci-
fied equipment. This policy would provide the Government
with a greater number of alternative proposals and enable
prime contractors to become more creative. [_ 21 :9_/ This
process is described in Appendix B.
After identification of the requirement or need, the
18

method of procurement is determined by the contracting
officer or the project manager. There are two primary
methods of procurement used in Government purchasing: for-
mal advertising and negotiation • Advertised procurement is
required by DAR £~7 : 1 -300 • 2_/ except under specific circum-
stances such as experimental, developmental, or research
work, classified purchases, technical or specialized sup-
lies whose production requires a substantial investment or
an extended period of preparation. There are seventeen
exceptions contained in DAR, ^~7:3-200_/ There are five
basic steps in formally advertised acquisitions including
preparation of the Invitation For Bid (IFB-a complete pur-
chasing package including all contractural requirements and
terms); distribution of the IFBs to a wide number of bidders
(a notice is published in the Commerce Business Daily for
any potential suppliers to request a copy of the IFB);
public opening, reading, and recording of the bids; eval-
uation of the bids; and award of the contract -co the lowest
responsible bidder.
Procurement by negotiation is a much more flexible
system. The Contracting Officer can select the suppliers
to whom he will submit the Request For Proposal (RFP),
all negotiations may be kept private, and an offeror may
change his proposal as a result of negotiation. It is in
the area of negotiated procurements that the Contracting
Officer is able to exert more authority, through his inter-
action with the contractor, and gain a more detailed view
19

of the contractor's procurement systems.
After the method of procurement is determined, the
solicitation document is prepared, the IFB for formally
advertised and the RFP for negotiated procurements. These
documents include items such as contract type, clauses,
specifications, delivery schedules, and any other items
required for the contractor to develop a proposal. When
preparing these documents, contracting and technical per-
sonnel are required to avoid using requirements and spec-
ifications which limit the number of competitors or the
ability of the prime contractor to compete for subcontracts.
The use of specifications taken directly from manufacturer's
products or the use of brand names could limit subcontract
competition.
Evaluation of proposals is simple in formally advertised
acquisitions. Award goes to the lowest responsive and
responsible bidder. That is "the bidder whose bid, con-
forming to the invitation for bids, is most advantageous to
the government." /~~1 5:555__7 The common interpretation of
this is that the lowest bidder gets the contract.
In negotiated procurements, much more time is spent in
evaluating a contractor's proposal. Price and cost analy-
sis are commonly used as are preaward surveys conducted by
either in-plant or regional contract administration personnel,
One of the primary evaluation factors considered in
negotiated procurements is the contractor's make-or-buy
program. A make-or-buy-program is "that part of a con-
tractor's written plan which identifies the major subsystems,
20

assemblies, subassemblies, and components to be manufac-
tured, developed, or assembled in his own facilities, and
those which will be obtained elsewhere by subcontract •"
/~7:3-902. 2__7 According to DAR , the contractor has the
basic responsibility for make-or-buy decisions and his
recommendations should be accepted unless they adversely
affect the Government's interest. With this in mind, DAR
requires that the following factors be considered in eval-
uation of the prime contractors' make-or-buy plan:
(1) whether the contractor has justified the performance
of work in plant which differs significantly from his
operations;
(2) the consequences of the contractor's projected plant
work loading with respect to overhead costs;
(3) the contractor's consideration of the competence,
ability, experience, and capacity available in other
firms, especially small business and labor surplus area
concerns;
(if) the contractor's make-or-buy history as to the type
of item concerned;
(5) whether small business and labor surplus area con-
cerns will be able to compete for subcontracts; and
(6) other elements, such as the nature of the items,
experience with similar items, future requirements,
engineering, tooling, starting load costs, market con-
ditions, and__the availability of personnel and materials.
Z 7:3-902.3_/
The final area in the preaward phase of Government
contracting in which the Contracting Officer can influence
the prime contractor's subcontracting policies is in the
type of contract used. Contract types are divided into two
groups: fixed price and cost reimbursement. The contract
type determines the amount of flexibility given to the
21

prime contractor under the terms of the contract. A firm-
fixed-price (FFP) contract is simply an agreement by the
Government to the contractor to pay a specified price to the
contractor when the latter delivers the required items.
There is no flexibility as to price and the seller has an
incentive to produce efficiently since he bears all of the
risk. A cost-plus-fixed fee (CPFF) contract, on the other
hand, guarantees to the contractor that the Governemnt will
pay all costs plus a specified fee and gives no incentive
to the contractor to produce efficiently, placing all of
the risk on the Government. These two types of contracts
are at opposite ends of the risk sharing spectrum. There
are several other contract types which use a more equitable
risk sharing concept. Some of these are:
Fixed-Price with Escalation (FPE)-used for contracts
covering a long period of time wherein there may be an
upward or downward change in price as a result of changes
in the material or labor rates;
Fixed-Price Incentive Fee (FPIF)-used when a reasonable
target price can be established. A formula is used pro-
viding for a target price, a ceiling price, and a variable
profit formula. This incentivizes the contractor to
become efficient to increase his relative profit;
Fixed-Price Level of Effort (FFP/LOE)-used when work
cannot be precisely described in advance, but the level
of effort can be. The seller is obliged to a specific
level of effort, for an agreed upon time, and for an
agreed upon fixed price.
Cost-Plus-Award-Fee (CPAF)-used to incentivize a particu-
lar criteria against which a contractor's performance
will be evaluated. This contract contains an estimated
cost, a base fee (may be zero), a maximum fee and an
award fee based on performance against the criteria;
Cost-Plus-Incentive Fee (CPIF)-a variation of the FPIF
using a tentative fee based on estimated costs, target
costs, and a variable profit formula. Z~~5:2C3-21_7
ZZ

Evaluation of the requirement and the availability of
the item or capabilities of industry usually determine the
type of contract. The type of contract has an impact on
the contractor's ability and desire to subcontract. If
awarded a contract where he has little or no flexibility
(FFP for example)? the prime contractor's incentive is to
achieve the best terms possible and competition should be
the method used. The same applies when using a CPAF con-
tract if the evaluation criteria include competition. In a
CPFF contract, however, since the fee is guaranteed and
costs covered by the Government, there is no incentive to
compete subcontracts.
Contract clauses are another means to increase subcon-
tract competition in the preaward phase. DAP requires
several different subcontract clauses to be used depending
on the type of contract. One clause required in negotiated
contracts over $10,000, except FFP contracts where the
award is on the basis of effective price competition, is:
Competition In Subcontracting (1962 APR)
The contractor shall select subcontractors (including
suppliers) on a competitive basis to the maximum extent
consistent with the objectives and requirements of the
contract. £~7 : 7- 1 0if . /+0_7
Other required clauses are contained in Appendix C and
include the requirements for consent to subcontracts and
approval of the contractor's procurement system. The
requirements for utilization of small and minority business
and labor surplus areas are also included in these clauses.
Besides these clauses , the Contracting Officer may use any
other clause he deems necessary for the proper performance

of the contract.
There have been several areas cited in the preaward
phase of the acquisition process which enable the Contract-
ing Officer to influence the prime contractor's use of com-
petitive subcontracts. These include the use of nonrestric-
tive specifications, preparation of the solicitation documents
to include sufficient information for contractors to identify
potential subcontractors prior to award, evaluation of make-
or-buy plans, input from preaward surveys, the use of var-
ious contract types, and the use of contract clauses.
The post award phase of the acquisition process is
primarily dedicated to the monitoring of contract perfor-
mance. Due to the large number of contracts awarded by a
contracting officer and the amount of time and manpower
required to properly administer the contract after award,
the Procuring Contracting Officer (PCO) normally forwards
the awarded contract to a Contract Administration Organi-
zation (CAO) for monitoring. The Navy and Air Force have
several inplant CAOs called Navy Plant Representative
Offices (NAVPROs) and Air Force Plant Representative Offices
(AFPROs). These service CAOs are located in plants which
require close service monitoring of special programs. The
Defense Contract Administration Service (DCAS) is respon-
sible for all contract administration in plants not under
the cognizance of a NAVPRO or AFPRO. DCAS also has several
inplant organizations called DCASPROs. Besides these there
are regional offices to conduct contract administration for
contractors which do not require an implant representative.
2k

The DCAS , NAVPRO, and AFPRO organizations are the primary
DOD contract administration organizations. Besides these,
though, the PCO may retain contract administration in his
own organization if he feels it necessary.
The primary goals of a CAO are:
1
.
To ensure that every right of the government is
properly observed.
2. To maximize the degree to which the contractor
effectively and efficiently produces an end item
which meets the requirements of the government.
3. To evaluate both formal and informal contractor
data sent to the procuring activity to determine their
credibility and utility to the government.
/+. To ensure that the information needed for sound
government decision making is provided.
5. To alert government managers to potential problem
areas.
6. To advise higher echelons on all matters requiring
a detailed knowledge of the contractor's operations
and progress on a specific contract.
7. To accomplish specific functions such as those
assigned in DAR 1-if06, or others as delegated. /~10:I-
\-kJ
Administration of specific contracts comes under the
authority of the Administrative Contracting Officer (ACO).
As a representative of the Government, an ACO may administer
any Government contract including amendments. Two of the
specific functions of the ACO and CAO in relation to sub-
contracts are:
1. to review, approve, or disapprove and maintain
surveillance of the contractor's procurement system;
and
2^ to consent to the placement of subcontracts.
Z 7:1-W_7
In order to accomplish these two objectives, the Contractor
25

Procurement System Review program and the consent to sub-
contracts clauses were developed. These two areas will be
covered in detail in Chapter III.
Thus, in the post award phase of the acquisition process
the Government influence over the primecontractor 's sub-
contracting policies is as a result of the monitoring of
the awarded contracts by the cognizant CAO. The results of
that monitoring may impact on the final determination of
contract price or may even impact on the decision to termin-





A. CONCERN REGARDING SUBCONTRACT COMPETITION
Concern over the use of competition in Government pro-
curement has been increasing due to the large number of
dollars spent annually and the apparent overall decrease in
the percentage of competitive procurements. This concern
was recently expressed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense
who stated:
During recent years, the percentage of Defense contract
dollars awarded as a result of competition has declined.
This decline is of increasing concern to the Secretary
of Defense and to the Congress. During congressional
hearings this year, Dr. Brown, Dr. Perry, and I have been
questioned about this problem. It is apparent that we
must direct out attention toward a reversal of the de-
clining trend in competition. Z~~ 11:1 _7
One of the prime areas which should be addressed in
increasing competition in Government acquisition is the
area of subcontracts. Although there is no privity of con-
tract between the Government and subcontractors, the fact
that approximately 50% of all Federal acquisition dollars
spent go to subcontractors, make this area extremely impor-
tant. /~20:1_7 There is high level concern that subcontract
competition is not being achieved sufficiently through
existing contracting procedures and practices. There is
also high level concern over the lack of statistical infor-
mation required to measure the extent of subcontract com-
petition. Testimonies before the Joint Economic Committee




Generally, there is not much true competition in sub-
contracting. My experience is that primes pay little
attention to getting the best possible prices for their
subcontracts, because subcontract prices can be passed
on to the Government, £ Vice Admiral Rickover 2:1^4_7
Your documentation this morning (a GAO report), I think
shows that in one way or another, subcontracting com-
petition is being avoided.
...but where you have subcontracting, it doesn't make any
sense that they can only get a sole source.... By and
large, however, I think this would be the great exception
that 99% of the time you could get competition...
/"Senator Proxmire 2:145_7
...we think the subcontracting area is. • .important
,
because you are talking about a prime who in turn relates
to a whole series of concerns. And one of the things
that the Procurement Commission is looking at very hard
is how you can get more competition into the subcontract-
ing field, because bigness is a fact of life.... The real
question is whether or not in the negotiating with primes
there is adequate attention also given to the subcontract-
ing field.... 1. Elmer B. Staats, Comptroller General of
the United States 2:1l+5_7
Military subcontracting is one area where the potential...
is great, and it is the area where we have the least
information. Until 1963> the Pentagon reported on the
proportion of prime contracts which were subcontracted
out. Such data is no longer available....
The major potential for widening the role of small busi-
ness in military procurement is to increase the subcon-
tractor ratio; and this is precisely the information which
since 1963 is no longer available.
It would be helpful to know more about this large segment
of the military market. .. .This would enable us to explore
the nature of competition for subcontracts. / Dr. Murray
Weidenbaum , 1:1 h,6_7
The Secretary of the Navy recently published a memoran-
dum concerning the need to increase competition in Defense
acquisitions. One paragraph specifically addressed sub-
contract competition:
We give no visibility to subcontracts, and to the degree
of competition that exists at the subcontract level. As
a result significant competition acquisitions at the
subcontract level are not identified and therefore, we
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are not able to appreciate the actual number of U.S.
industrial concerns that have received DOD dollars com-
petitively at the subcontract level. Since approximately
50 percent of prime contract dollars result in subcon-
tracts, the impact of competitive subcontracting should
be given visibility, Z~~20:3__7
It can be seen from the preceding statements that there
is significant concern at high levels of Government over
the degree of competition being achieved in subcontracting.
B. THE NEED FOR COMPETITION
The use of competition promises several direct and in-
direct benefits for the Government. First of all, the use
of competition tends to result in lower prices and greater
technological achievement, or, in other words, a better
product for less cost. £~2.7:2J This is based on the theory
that when firms are competing for a contract they have an
incentive to bid lower and develop better products in order
to win the business. Contrary to this, if a firm is a sole
source for an item and is aware of its status, it has no
incentive to offer a reasonable price or to improve its
product.
One indirect benefit of competition is derived from the
assumption that competition ensures "fairness". Congress
is interested in the "fair" distribution of acquisition
funds and supports the use of competition as the most
practicable method for achieving this. This policy allows
Congress to assume the role of an equitable and even handed
distributor of the public's funds and relieves the Govern-
ment of some intense public scrutiny and skepticism on the
way funds are used. The scrutiny and skepticism are still
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present, but less intense. /T^7'k_7
Another benefit of competition is the reduction of de-
pendence by the military on a few firms and an expansion of
the industrial base. This expansion not only allows the
military to have options for its supplies, but also helps
spread the economic benefits of large procurement programs
throughout the country.
There are some negative aspects to the use of competition
which should be mentioned. The need for standardization in
the military is a major argument against competition.
Standardization allows interchangeability of parts and
systems throughout the services and increases the flexi-
bility of existing equipment. Competition tends to limit
standardization through the use of more than one source in
the life of an item. Different sources may produce incom-
patible items from the same specifications due to inter-
pretations of the specifications and differing production
techniques.
The use of Government procurement as a socio-economic
tool is another argument against the use of competition.
Using strict competition as a basis of award would, for the
most part, exclude some small or minority run businesses
and give no preference for areas which are in economic need
of business. Established firms would have the edge due to
their experience, size, and ability to be flexible. This
would tend to limit new firms from entering the market in
areas already covered by established firms.
The need for competition must be weighed against the
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requirements of each individual acquisition. In some cases,
socio-economic factors or standardization requirements may
outweigh cost requirements. Government regulations such as
DAR have been written to include rules and procedures to
incorporate these considerations into each procurement.
C. OBJECTIVES OF THE GOVERNMENT
The primary objective of the Government in acquisition
is to acquire goods or services to fulfill a need at the
least cost to the Government. The emphasis on least cost is
due to the use of public funds as constrained and budgeted
by Congress. Congress controls the purse strings and is
in turn answerable to the people - the source of the funds.
The use of public funds is therefore under the scrutiny of
Congress and the people at all times. People do not appre-
ciate high taxes and members of Congress desire to retain
their elected positions. Therefore there is significant
emphasis throughout Government procurement on minimizing
costs when fulfilling a requirement.
A second objective in the Government acquisition process
is the implementation of socio-economic programs. It is the
Government's responsibility to ensure a healthy and growing
economy. Since the Government does not control the funds
of individual firms, it depends on the Government acquisi-
tion process to implement its programs dealing with the
economy, incorporated into the Government's procurement




A third objective of Government acquisition is to main-
tain an industrial base sufficient to cope with any major
crisis such as a war. It is desired that funds be spread
throughout the existing industrial base to maintain or to
increase it. The Government's acquisition process again is
the only direct control that the Government has to achieve
this objective.
D. PRIME CONTRACTOR AND SUBCONTRACTOR OBJECTIVES
The primary objective of most businesses is to earn
revenue for the owners or stockholders and for the con-
tinued existence or growth of the firm. This is true for
both primecontractors and subcontractors, it is with this
goal in mind that businesses negotiate their contracts. The
prime contractor attempts to win the best terms possible from
the Government; financial, technical, and schedule included.
The prime then attempts to achieve what he considers the
best terms in his favor from proposed subcontractors. The
terms achieved are normally consistent with the firms current
objectives, which may be to maximize profit, utilize exist-
ing production facilities, increase technical capabilities,
or even to develop a new market. Thus the prime contract or
may be motivated by any one of a number of goals.
The subcontractor is normally motivated by the same
reasons that the prime is motivated. The size of the sub-
contractor has a great deal to do with his objectives
though. Large firms use subcontracts to utilize excess
plant capability and to develop into different product areas.
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Small subcontractors however, are subcontractors by nec-
essity in many cases. They are small, with limited re-
sources, and, in many cases, have only one product or type
of product which they can produce. The primary objective
of these small subcontractors is to continue in business
as well as make a profit,
E. GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS WHICH AFFECT SUBCONTRACTING
In order to have some impact in the area of subcon-
tracts, the Government has several programs written into
their acquisition regulations. Some of these programs
include the Contractor Procurement System Review (CPSR),
the right to consent to subcontracts, the Component Break-
out Policy, and Small Business Subcontracting Policy, The
following is a brief summary of these programs,
1 . Contractor Procurement Systems Review
In 1952, the requirements for contractors to furn-
ish detailed data on every subcontract or purchase order
was causing excessive dalays in the acquisition process.
Recognizing this, the Headquarters, Air Material Command
USAF developed the Procurement Systems Review, /"~26:355_7
The purpose of this review was to conduct a review of the
contractor's procurement system in lieu of a review of
individual purchases orders or subcontracts. This process
evolved and was adopted for the entire Department of Defense
when it was incorporated into the Armed Services Procurement
Regulation in 1966. Z~26:356_7 In its present form, this
program is called the Contractor Procurement System Review
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(CPSR). The CPSR includes the evaluation of "purchasing of
materials, services, subcontracting, and subcontract man-
agement, and in the case of major system acquisition pro-
grams, ..includes the management of the acquisition of
material and services through purchase, from development of
the requirement through completion of subcontract perfor-
mance." £~7: 23- 100J
The CPSR is required to be conducted on a contrac-
tor's procurement system when his negotiated sales to the
Government both as a prime and a subcontractor are in excess
of $10,000,000 per year. The objectives of the review are
to provide:
1. a means for evaluating the efficiency and effective-
ness with which the contractor spends Government funds;
2. the basis for the administrative contracting officer
(ACO) to grant, withhold, or withdraw approval of the
contractor's procurement system;
3. reliable current information to the procuring con-
tracting officer (PCO) on the contractor's procuring
system for use in source selection, determining the
appropriate type of contract, and establishing profit
and fee objectives;
if. an independent review of the contractor's procurement
system to optimize its effectiveness in complying with
Government policy; and
3» current procurement system information for appro-
priate Department of Defense activities in areas of
Government interest. £ 7:23-100_J7
A major part of the CPSP is the determination of
whether the contractor competes his purchases and subcon-
tracts to the maximum extent practicable. Items covered
in this determination include whether:
1. a sufficient number of sources is solicited; and
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2, subcontracting procedures provide other elements of
adequate and effective price competition, including -
A. adequate descriptions of any factors to be eval-
uated, and
B. evaluation of all offers on a common basis, £~7'-2.3-
103J7
The CPSR is conducted by a Procurement Systems
Analyst (PCA) who is normally assigned to the cognizant
CAO. After the initial CPSR is conducted, the PSA makes
a report to the ACO for the granting, continuing, wit li-
dding, or withdrawl of approval of the contractor's pro-
curement system. After approval of a contractor's procure-
ment system, the ACO is required to develop a surveillance
system whereby he assures, with the assistance of the PSA
and contract auditors, that the procurement system continues
to warrant approval. The penalties which may result from
an unapproved system include reduction profit rates, lower
negotiated prices, and increased Government surveillance,
Z~7: 23- 106_7
The Commission of Government Procurement Report of
1972, mentioned several areas concerning CPSRs which were
reducing their effectiveness and recommended that they be
corrected. These include:
1, Consolidation of the CPSR program under one central
authority. There was a lack of uniformity in conducting
CPSRs between DCAS , the Navy, and the Air Force. This
tended to weaken the motivation for contractors to es-
tablish sound procurement systems by the fact that the
Government did not have a firm and consistent policy.
2. Inclusion of special provisions in the contract by
the negotiator tended to negate the relief from indi-
vidual consent requirements,
J>* Within DOD, due to manpower limitations, the program
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did not fulfill its ASPR mandate of scope or coverage.
Z+. Significant benefits would be obtained_from a formal
training capability for PSAs within DOD. /_ 26:389-391_/
The CPSR program is a method by which the Govern-
ment can keep a limited degree of control over a contrac-
tor's procurement system. Although the program is well
structured there have been some deficiencies as reported
by the Commission of Government Procurement.
2. Government Consent to Subcontracts
In certain instances, the Government finds it nec-
essary to retain the right to consent to the prime con-
tractor's proposed subcontracts. This may be because the
item is critical and requires Government monitoring, the
item may have a significant cost impact, or the item may
impact on schedule. DAR lists the conditions under which
consent is required. For Fixed-Price Contracts (except FFP
and FPE) consent is required if the proposed subcontract is
a cost reimbursement, time and materials, or labor hours
contract estimated to be in excess of $25,000; if the pro-
posed subcontract will exeed $100,000; or if the proposed
subcontractor will receive in excess of $100,000 in total
subcontracts under the prime contract. ^""7:7-1 0/f. 23_/ For
Cost Reimbursement Contracts, consent is required for any
proposed cost reimbursement, time and materials, or labor
hours subcontract, for proposed fixed price subcontracts in
excess of $25,000 or five percent of the total estimated
cost of the prime contract; and for any proposed subcontract
requiring fabrication, purchase, rental, installation, or
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other acquisition of special test equipment having a value
in excess of Si ,000 or of any items of industrial facilities.
/~7
: 7-203 . 8_7 Consent may also be required if the Con-
tracting Officer decides to lower the threshold for closer
surveillance of critical items. Consent may be deleted for
items identified during negotiations except in major systems
acquisitions. /~~7 : 23-201
.1_J7
Consent to subcontracts is conducted by the cogni-
zant contracting officer whether it be the PCO or ACO.
Consent to a subcontract however does not constitute a deter-
mination of the subcontract cost or the allowability of
costs. It does minimize the requirement for retroactive
review of subcontracts, except cost reimbursement subcon-
tracts, for the purpose of determining reasonableness of
costs, unless there is some indication that costs may be
unreasonable. ^~7 : 23-202__7
In reviewing proposed subcontracts, the Contracting
Officer is required to consider a wide range of areas. The
areas are listed in DAP. £"l : 23-202__7 One of the areas
considered is the basis for selecting the proposed subcon-
tractor, including the price competition obtained. This
factor could be used as a basis for not consenting to the
subcontract.
The Government action in response to the use of a
subcontractor which was not consented to would be in the
determination of allowable costs and final contract price.
3. The Component Breakout Policy
The Component Breakout Policy is used in Government
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acquisition as a means of providing specific equipments or
items to prime contractors directly from the Government
when it is to the Government's advantage to provide the
items. The policy as listed in DAP is:
Whenever it is anticipated that the prime contract for a
weapons system or other major end item will be awarded
without adequate price competition, and the prime con-
tractor is e"xpected to acquire a component without such
competition, it is the Department of Defense policy to
break out that component if:
i. substantial net cost savings will probably be
achieved; and
ii. such action will not jeopardize the quality,
reliability, performance or timely delivery of the
end item.
The desirability of breakout should also be considered
(regardless of whether the prime contract or the com-
ponent being purchased by the prime contractor is on the
basis of price competition) whenever substantial net cost
savings will result (A) from greater quantity purchases
or (B) from such factors as improved logistics support
through reduction in varieties of spare parts and econ-
omies in operations and training through standardization
of design. Primary breakout consideration shall be given
to those components of the end item representing the
highest annual procurement costs and offering the largest
potential net savings through breakout, /~7: 1-326. 2.
J
Although the Component Breakout Policy does not
directly affect the prime contractor's use of competition,
it gives the Government an option to avoid having to depend
on the prime contractor for items that the Government can
obtain under better terms. Since prime contractors are given
a management fee as part of the prime contract price, a
reduction of subcontracts and thereby the management fee,
reduces the prime contractor's profit.
km Small Business
As previously mentioned, the Government uses the
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acauisition process to implement many of its socio-econimic
programs. One of the largest programs which affects ac-
quisition is the Small Business and Small Disadvantaged
Business Program. A small business is defined as a concern
which is independently owned and operated, is not dominant
in the field of operation in which it is bidding on Govern-
ment contracts, and, with its affiliates, can further qual-
ify under the size criteria in DAB. /"~7:1-?01 . \J A small
disadvantaged business concern is one which qualifies under
the definition of a small business plus is at least 51
percentum owned by one or more socially and economically
disadvantaged individuals. / 7:7-203.7^_7
The policy concerning the use of Small Business and
Small Disadvantaged Business Concerns is:
to enable small business concerns to be considered fairly
as subcontractors to contractors performing work or
rendering services as prime contractor or subcontractors
under Government contracts, and to assure that prime_con-
tractors and subcontractors carry out this policy. / 7:1-
707. 2
J
In October 1978, Public Law 95-507 was enacted which
implemented several changes to the Small Business subcon-
tracting procedures in Government acquisition. Some of
the requirements of this change include:
1. Establishment of an Office of Small and Disadvantaged
Business Utilization in each Federal agency with procure-
ment authority.
2. The requirement for contractors to submit subcontract-
ing plans for all contracts in excess of $500,000 to
include percentage goals for the utilization of small and
small disadvantaged firms.
3« The use of incentives by the Government to increase




Zf. Inclusion of the small disadvantaged business concern
representation in all purchases other than small pur-
chases. /^7:1-707_7
The Government controls the amount of small business
participation through the requirement for the PCO to deter-
mine the adequacy of the contractor's subcontracting plan
as a basis for award. This program is aimed at increasing
the number of small businesses receiving Federal funds and
thereby stimulating the economy. It is competitive by rea-
son of increasing the number of possible sources.
F. SUMMARY
This chapter has described the background necessary
for an understanding of the concept of competition at the
subcontract level and the Government's requirement that it
be used. Areas covered included the concern expressed
regarding competition, the need for competition, objectives
of the Government and industry, and Government programs
affecting competition. The following chapter will describe
the data collected in an attempt to analyze the state of




The purpose of this chapter is to present some of the
answers to questions used during interviews and literature
searches by the researcher as well as an analysis of these
answers. Areas to be covered include the current nature of
competitive Government procurement, competitive practices
as used by the Government and industry, and problems en-
countered in attempting to compete subcontracts,
A. COMPETITION AT THE SUBCONTRACT LEVEL
In determining the nature of competition at the sub-
contract level, several different questions were asked of
the interviewees. These included their definitions of
competition, the kinds of items subcontracted for, sub-
contractor size, the degree of competition currently being
achieved, and their perception of the need for competition.
The following are summaries of their responses.
1 , Corn-petition Defined
When asked to characterize competition at the sub-
contract level, the first aspect cited by all of the inter-
viewees v/as the definition of competition. Each inter-
viewee had a different concept of what competition was. One
prime contractor stated that his company considered a sub-
contract to be competitive if it received more than one
response to a Request for Quotation (RFQ), regardless of
any large differences in the quoted prices or divergence
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from the proposed terras and conditions. Three other prime
contractors interviewed stated that competition was obtained
with the receipt of three or more bids with at least two
qualifying as responsive.
All of the subcontractors interviewed stated that
they felt themselves in a competitive environment for all
transactions except those in which their company held a
patent or could otherwise be considered a sole source.
A Government source at DCAS stated that the defini-
tion of competition as used in conducting CPSRs was that
there be a minimum of three bids to any RFQ.
Although each company interviewed had a specific
idea of what competition meant to them, there was found to
be no generally accepted definition or criterion used in
industry to define the concept of competition. The only
clear cut definition of competition found in Government was
the DAR definition of adequate price competition. /~7'3-
80ff.7_7 This lack of a general definition between the
Government and industry makes measurement of the extent of
competition industry-wide in subcontracting virtually
impossible. Several interviewees indicated that the dif-
ferent standards used by the different actors in the ac-
quisition process contribute significantly to the confusion
and complicate the job of the Government Contracting Officer
in making his decisions.
2. Types of Items Subcontracted
The amount of competition obtained in subcontracting
is also highly dependent upon the types of items for v/hich

subcontracts are awarded. For most raw materials and com-
monly used components, prices are normally close between
sources and there are usually a large number of sources
available. The type of competition sought by the prime con-
tractors interviewed for such items centered primarily on
delivery terms. The prime contractors stated that since
price was normally fixed over a small range for these items,
it was to their advantage to contract for the best delivery
terms in order to decrease their risk.
Highly specialized parts such as pumps or valves
that are patented, technologically complex items such as
rocket engines or guidance systems, and items requiring
large plant capacities such as airframes or ships hulls
were identified by interviewees as more difficult to compete
due to the limited number of sources with the capability to
produce them. Competition for subcontracts with these
sources is further reduced if their plants are in use or if
they are competing directly against the prime contractor for
the same contract. Interviewees stated that as a general
rule, the amount of competition available for an item varies
inversely with the degree of complexity, difficulty, or
capital investment required for production of that item.
3» Subcontractor Size
The subcontractor himself will have different char-
acteristics depending upon the situation. A common miscon-
ception is that subcontractors are always small with limited
capacities. Although this is true in some cases, it is far
from true in the majority of instances. It is very common
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for a company the size of McDonell-Douglas to be a subcon-
tractor to another corporate giant, such as General Dynamics.
This is especially true in the development of large expensive
programs requiring huge capital investments and extensive
technological development. Teaming agreements are used in
some instances with one company taking the lead as the prime
contractor and the other assuming the subcontractor role.
In any major system acquisition, a prime contractor
may have a corporate giant as well as several smaller com-
panies as subcontractors. Interviewees stated that with the
increased Government emphasis on small and minority business
involvement in Federal acquisitions, the number of these
small subcontractors should be increasing.
As an example of the mixture of subcontractors, a
study was recently conducted on four major defense systems
acquisitions which included 18 subcontractors. Of the 18,
seven conducted more business as subcontractors, and four
felt that their business was evenly divided between prime
contracts and subcontracts. / 23;3 if_7
It can be seen from these figures that a company
can be a prime contractor for one contract, subcontractor
for another, and prime contractor for the next. No company
is permanantly relegated to a specific role,
if. Amount of Subcontract Competition
Considering the differences in definitions of com-
petition together with the various types of subcontracted
items and the sizes of the firms, there were some very
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interesting statistics given by the interviewees as to the
extent of subcontract competition currently being achieved.
Since most companies interviewed did not separate their
statistics between production and development subcontracts,
the statistics quoted will be a combination of both types
of procurement.
One prime contractor in the aerospace industry
stated that in 1977, 60% of his company's subcontracts
were competitive and that in 1978 this figure increased to
76%. His figures for the number of sole sources were un-
available because they were lumped together with single
sources and directed subcontracts. Another aerospace firm
claimed that 95% of all of its subcontracts were competitive
and that 90% of its total subcontracted dollars were com-
petitive. It claimed an upward trend in competition. All
four major prime contractors interviewed estimated that at
least 60% of their subcontracts were competitive and that
they were improving that figure yearly.
Subcontractors interviewed varied in the amount of
their sales which were competitive from 20% to 95% and could
give no substantial estimates on the overall amount of
competitive subcontracting in their industries.
Perhaps the most significant figures on the amount
of competitive subcontracting were those supplied by DCAS
based on the results of CPSRs from companies meeting CPSR
threshold requirements. The amount of competition in sub-
contracts over $1 0,000 in 1978 was 1+2% of orders and 37%
of dollars spent. Both figures have been steadily declining
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since 1971 when 52% of orders and I+Q% of dollars spent were
competitive. DCAS attributed this decline to the changing
mixture of contractors, a decline in the total number of
contracts, and the desire to keep certain contractors in
business in order to maintain an industrial base.
As can be seen by these figures, there is a con-
siderable difference in the amount of competitive subcon-
tracting perceived by industry and the figures obtained by
the Government. This difference is accentuated by the lack
of a common definition of competition, the product mixes
of the industries interviewed, and the limited sources
available to the Government, primarily only CPSP qualified
firms.
5. The Need for Corn-petition
Industry and Government also differ in their opinions
as to whether there is sufficient competition already in
subcontracting. Interviewees were asked if they perceived
a need to increase the amount of competitive subcontracting.
Congress perenially brings up the need for more
competitive subcontracting. As Senator Proxmire stated
before the Joint Economic Committee in 1972 "...subcontract-
ing competition is being avoided." /~2:1if5_7 OFPP and DCAS
interviewees stated that the need for competitive subcon-
tracting as called for by the Congress stems from a lack
of complete statistics as to the extent of subcontracting.
There is no centralized or standardized reporting procedure
for prime contractors to report on the amount and type of
competition achieved in subcontracting. The only

measurements taken are of the extent of small business
participation, competition as measured in CPSRs conducted
by DCAS, the Navy, and Air Force (limited to prime contrac-
tors conducting over $1 0,000,000 in Government contracts
per year), and figures held by individual project offices.
There are no data bases available to measure the amount of
all subcontracts awarded competitively.
Prime contractors interviewed felt that there was
sufficient competition available and being achieved by their
companies. One aerospace contractor stated that there were
always 6-7 responses to each RFQ. All prime contractors
interviewed felt that the Government should not take steps
to try to increase the amount of competition due to the
potential increases in contract prices and time required to
accomplish any new requirements.
The subcontractors interviewed also felt that there
was sufficient competition. They expressed the fear that if
the Government were to push for an increase in competition
then they may lose some of their bargaining power with
prime contractors due to the increase of options. The sub-
contractors interviewed did not want an increase in competi-
tion for items they were already producing, they preferred
to be sole source or one of a very few sources in order to
ensure a market.
Thus it can be seen that there is no agreement on
the sufficiency of competition at this time. The Govern-
ment lacks data, prime contractors are content and want no
more Government interference, and subcontractors are not
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all in favor of competition due to its effect on their
market,
6. Summary
The nature of competition at the subcontract level
varies from contract to contract as can be deduced from the
preceding section. Factors which affect the nature of
competition in subcontracting include the various defini-
tions of competition, the types and sizes of firms, the cost
and complexity of the requirement, and the desire of the
interested parties to achieve competition,
B. COMPETITIVE PRACTICES
The degree of competition obtained in a subcontract is
dependent on the actions taken by all three parties involved:
the Government, prime contractor, and subcontractor. Each
of these actors affects the amount of competition through
its policies and procedures. The following paragraphs
describe some of the areas where each actor influences the
amount of competition,
1 , Prime Contractors
When asked how they were achieving competition at
the subcontract level, prime contractors described their
efforts in three major areas; source selection, contract
type, and source development. The following is a summary
of their efforts.
a. Source selection
The prime contractors interviewed stated that
after the decision to buy an item is made, the specifications
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for the Request for Quotation (RFQ) were developed in the
prime contractor's engineering departments based on the prime
contract specifications, the material known to be available
on the market, and the estimated capabilities of known
suppliers. In some cases, especially in new development
contracts or in technical areas in which the prime con-
tractor has little or no expertise, potential subcontrac-
tors are queried for input to the proposed specifications.
Dependence on subcontractors for specifications gives these
subcontractors an advantage in competing for the proposed
subcontract; they have a head start on proposal prepara-
tion and, since they helped provide the specifications,
they potentially have a technical advantage. Prime con-
tractors stated that this practice was not desirable because
it put the potential subcontractor into a very strong bar-
gaining position and tended to make the prime contractor
dependent on him, but that in some cases it was necessary
to fulfill prime contract requirements. In cases calling
for off-the-shelf items the specification preparers weigh
the known cost and quality of these items against the esti-
mated costs and quality of specially manufactured items.
All prime contractors interviewed preferred to use com-
mercial items, if available, due to the decreased risk in
production, schedule, and unknown costs. It was felt by
the prime contractors that competing these items would not
increase quality or reduce cost because the items had
already been tested, marketed, and proved reliable.
After the RFQs have been prepared, they are
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submitted to potential sources as identified by the prime
contractor's bidders lists. These lists identify all
potential sources by name and by capability. Inputs to
these lists come from unsolicited proposals, advertising,
past experience, reputation, evaluations prime contrac-
tor personnel, professional journal articles, and in some
cases, from recommendations by Government contracting per-
sonnel. All prime contractors interviewed stated that they
had excellent industry coverage in their bidders lists as
evidenced by their success in receiving a large number of
bids on most RFQs. The prime contractor stated that the
only area of their bidders lists which was incomplete was
in the identification of small disadvantaged businesses
which are being promoted by the Government's small business
policies.
After development of the bidders lists, most
of the prime contractors used a source selection board to
assign evaluation weights to the various sections of the
RFQ. This board was normally headed by the director of
subcontracts and included representatives from the engi-
neering, quality assurance, and manufacturing departments.
In most cases, this board also reviewed the potential
sources on the bidders lists and either selected the sources
to be solicited or prepared letters of interest to deter-
mine which sources would be interested in responding.
Assignment of the evaluation factors prior to sending out
the RFQ was considered to be a sound competitive practice
by all of the interviewees. Most of the prime contractors
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interviewed included the evaluation weights in their RFQs.
One major aerospace subcontract manager stated that his
company did not include these weights because the form con-
sidered them as being extraneous information and that bid-
ding firms could be better evaluated if they were unaware
of the weighting and judged only on their perception of the
requirement. Other prime contractors considered inclusion
of these weights as a factor which could contribute to com-
petition as well as foster better bids. Inclusion of the
weights could prevent a competitive advantage by a firm
which has had prior business with the prime contractor and
is accustomed to the prime's evaluation criteria over another
firm which has had little or no experience with the prime.
All of the major prime contractors made use of
bidders conferences for major purchases during which they
clarified any areas of confusion for all potential sources.
These conferences were primarily held for large or complex
developmental or systems subcontracts. The primary goal
of these conferences was to ensure that all of the bidders
were bidding for exactly the same items and secondarily,
to ensure that all of the bidders had exactly the same
information.
The procedures for evaluating proposals was
found to be standard throughout the prime contractors inter-
viewed. After proposals were received they were broken
down into areas of expertise and forwarded to the members
of the source evaluation committee. This committee normally
consisted of the principle engineer involved, the material
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manager, manufacturing experts, financial auditors, and the
subcontract manager (in some cases this evaluation team
was the same as the source selection board). Each member
saw only the proposal sections in his area of expertise and
received all of the proposals at the same time. After
evaluation was completed, the results were forwarded to the
source selection board for determination of award. Depend-
ing on the size and importance of the subcontract, final
approval was sometimes required at the highest levels of
some firms.
The primary areas evaluated in the source selec-
tion process were: 1) technical approach; 2) cost; 3) past
experience; k) manufacturing capability; 5) schedule; and
6) management. The weighting varied depending on the mater-
ial required and the conditions of the prime contract, but
generally, prime contractors insisted that the technical
approach was the primary criterion.
Source selection procedures as outlined above
were found to be standard throughout the prime contractors
interviewed with the exception of inclusion of evaluation
weighting factors in the RFQ. All of the prime contractors
interviewed were CPSR approved. This review process did
not surface any problems with the prime contractors' source
selection systems.
b. Contract Type
In the area of contract type, the prime contrac-
tor attempts to put himself into the optimum risk position
relative to the subcontractor. If he can, the prime
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contractor will attempt to force the subcontractor to assume
the risks of cost overruns, schedules, and deliveries in
order to minimize the prime contractor's potential for
failing on the prime contract. The type of contract used
by the prime contractor determines much of the risk sharing
and can scare away some potential bidders.
When questioned about what types of contracts
were used in their subcontracts, the prime contractors'
responses varied with the type of acquisition and who the
subcontractor was. Cost-type contracts were primarily used
for highly technical or developmental procurements where the
risk of failure was high. Fixed-price contracts were used
on smaller developmental and almost all production procure-
ments. The size of the subcontractor also played a large
role in the type of subcontract. Subcontracts between
large companies were found to be more flexible primarily
due to the large subcontractor's bargaining position, A
General Dynamics program subcontracted to Hughes Aircraft
utilized a cost-type subcontract because Hughes would not
accept a more inflexible type and was the only firm avail-
able with the capacity to produce the requirement. Small
subcontractors, on the other hand, were normally found to
be forced to accept more inflexible contracts due to their
dependence on the large primes for a market and the number
of competitors at that level. All of the prime contractors
interviewed stated that they preferred to use Firm-Fixed-




Concern over the affect of contract type on
competition was varied. One prime contractor stated that
the subcontractors could "take it or leave it" because his
firm could always find another source. Another prime con-
tractor stated that if his subcontractors ran into diffi-
culties due to the type of contract they were forced to
accept, his firm would probably be "glad to buy them up"
and finish the contract with the former subcontractor as a
subsidiary. Another prime contractor stated that his com-
pany tried to be as equitable as possible in risk sharing
by being flexible on contract type in negotiations. This
company realized that non-performance by the subcontractor
due to contract type (forcing them out of business) would
not help the prime contractor to fulfill his prime contract
terms.
All of the prime contractors were concerned
over their right to data developed by a subcontractor in
the performance of the subcontract. As a flow down from
the Government prime contract, all of the prime contractors
used a data rights clause in their development contracts.
The clause claimed the prime contractor's and/or the Govern-
ment's right to any data developed by the subcontractor.
The primary purpose of the clause v/as to prevent the sub-
contractor from becoming a sole-source and to provide a
data package to enable other sources to competitively bid
on follow-on contracts. Although the prime contractors
agreed that the data rights clause was extremely useful
they all agreed that if the Government did not claim and
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pay for data rights in its prime contract then the prime
contractor certainly would not - because the extra cost to
the prime contractor would not be guaranteed reimburseable.
It has been shown that prime contractors prefer
to use the type of contract which reduces their risk the
most. Some prime contractors attempt to be equitable in
their negotiations with subcontractors while others depend
on the competitive nature of subcontracting to enable them
to use inflexible subcontracts. Data rights are considered
by all prime contractors to be important but they are not
willing to pay for them without a guaranteed reimbursement.
c. Source Development
It is important that prime contractors be able
to identify or develop new sources in order to reduce the
number of sole-source subcontracts and to increase their
options in awarding and developing new products. Different
prime contractors have opposite views on how to increase
their sources. Some are active and others inactive. Most
of the prime contractors interviewed depended upon estab-
lished bidders lists and engineering appraisals of exist-
ing sources.
A subcontract manager at one aerospace firm
stated that if the Government did not specifically supply
funds to develop sources then his firm would do nothing.
The firm required a contract to include specific direction
and funding for new source development.
Only one major firm was found which had an
active and positive source development program. The company's
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executives were given performance evaluations based on a
management by objectives concept. One of the primary areas
covered in the evaluation was source development. It was
company policy that all departments would actively seek
out new potential sources to increase the company's selec-
tion base and allow the company to become potentially more
competitive for prime contracts through an increase of
options. The company provided limited funding and techni-
cal support to new sources, especially if they had the
potential and desire to compete against sole-sources. One
method employed by this prime contractor was to identify
a source with the capability or potential to bid against a
sole-source, and to encourage that source to develop its
own specifications and to compete. This program had two
potential results: 1) the original sole-source would reduce
its price in the face of competition; and 2.) the new source
could underbid the original source and win the contract.
In one case cited by the prime contractor, the prime con-
tractor realized a reduction of 20-50% in subcontract costs,
a faster schedule, and a marked increase in quality from
the other competing subcontractors.
All of the prime contractors interviewed have
initiated programs to identify potential sources in the
small and economically disadvantaged business areas as a
result of the requirement of P.L. 95-50? to establish goals
for the use of these sources. These programs currently
consist of reviews of existing bidders lists and industry
searches for new sources. Prime contractors stated that
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their initial emphasis is on the quantity rather than the
quality of these firms that they can identify and use.
2. Subcontractors
The subcontractors interviewed stated that their
efforts to increase their competitive positions were pri-
marily in the areas of marketing and new production develop-
mento Efforts in these areas were dependent largely upon
the size of the firm and how much of its business was
dedicated to subcontracts,
a. Marketing
The amount of marketing devoted to subcontracts
varied according to the size of the firm and its product
mix. Large subcontractors stated that their size and
diverse capabilities enabled them to be competitive on a
large range of items. Their research and development and
marketing efforts were primarily concentrated in the prime
contract area, but they did a reasonable amount of these
functions to keep their plants in operation in case of a
shortage of prime contracts.
Small subcontractors interviewed stated that
they were highly dependent on advertising, anticipating
demand, and new ideas in order to beat their competition
and win contracts. Their marketing efforts covered areas
such as; published advertisements in journals and magazines;
new product descriptions submitted to potential contractors;
good informal relations with prime contractor personnel;
and, unsolicited proposals. In order to anticipate demand,
the small contractors kept abreast of current or planned
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programs through the Commerce Business Daily, the Wall
Street Journal, discussions with prime contractors, and
discussions with Government engineers.
b. New Products
Subcontractors are highly dependent on either
the products that they have exclusive rights to or new
products which have few or only one producer. Most small
subcontractors felt that they were not "-competitive" if
they were not a sole source or one of a very few sources
for an item. This position was their only guanantee of
obtaining subcontracts and being able to remain in busi-
ness. It was found that many of the small subcontractors
were started as a result of a single new idea or product
and were dependent upon that item or a new one to remain
in existence. For this reason, many of the small firms are
dedicated to new product development and remaining sole-
source. Competition to them would mean a significant de-
crease in income resulting in a decrease in the amount of
funding for new research. For this reason, most small
firms did everything in their power to maintain sole-source
status including retention of data rights, the use of
patents, and dedicating large percentages of their funds to
new product development.
Thus small subcontractors increase their com-
petitive position through advertising and research and
development. The "competitive" position sought by the
small subcontractor is that of the sole-source in order to
guarantee his continued existence. It would not be logical
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to expect to incentivize these small subcontractors to
diversify thereby putting themselves into weaker bargain-
ing positions with prime contractors and eliminating their
guaranteed markets.
3. The Government
Although the Government has no privity of contract
with the subcontractor and relies on the prime contractor
to make and administer subcontracts, it does take several
steps to encourage the prime contractor to compete his sub-
contracts. The Government does this to increase the
potential for cost savings and increased quality. Some of
the steps taken by the Government to promote competition
include: CPSR; Government consent to subcontracts; the
requirement for small business participation in Government
subcontracts; the use of second sourcing; Government Fur-
nished Equipment; contract clauses; and, contract types.
The following paragraphs describe these steps.
a. CPSR
One of the primary methods of ensuring that a
prime contractor is adequately competing his subcontracts
is through the use of the CPSP. The DAP directs that in
reviewing a contractor's procurement system a determination
shall be made "as to whether subcontracting is done com-
petitively to the maximum practicable extent." /~7:23-103.b7
This determination requires therefore, ascertaining whether:
(i) a sufficient number of sources is solicited; and
(ii) subcontracting procedures provide other elements of
adequate and effective price competition, including
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(A) adequate descriptions of any factors to be eval-
uated, and
(B) evaluation of all offers on a common basis,
I 7:23-103b_7
As an example of the criteria used for deter-
mining adequate price competition, the factors considered
by DCAS during a CPSR are contained in Appendix D.
The procedures and steps of the CPSR program
are contained in Chapter III.
b. Government Consent to Subcontracts
The Government also ensures that the prime
contractor is competing his subcontracts through the use of
the requirement for Government consent to subcontracts as
described in Chapter III. The clauses for fixed-price
contracts and cost-type contracts differ from each other
and are contained in Appendix B. It should be reemphasized
that despite the threshold limitations in DAR , contracts
requiring extraordinary Government surveillance may be
subject to these clauses.
c. Small Business Requirements
The enactment of P.L. 95-507 which established
a new small business and small disadvantaged business sub-
contracting program is another Government action which is
intended to increase competition. It requires the apparent
successful offeror or low bidder for construction contracts
exceeding $'1 ,000,000 and all other contracts exceeding
$500,000 to submit subcontracting plans for the utilization
of small businesses and small businesses owned and con-
trolled by socially and economically disadvantaged
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individuals. Subcontracting plans will include percentage
goals for using such firms and these goals will be used in
the final determination of award. Any failure of the con-
tractor to comply with these subcontracting plans will be
considered a material breach of contract. ^ 3-3_7 The
Government expects this program to increase the number of
small subcontractors receiving funds from Government con-
tracts.
d. Second Sourcing
One method that the Government uses to preclude
the development of sole-source subcontractors is to require
that the prime contractor have at least two sources for
critical items. This accomplishes two things. It elim-
inates the sole-source with the potential for driving up
contract price and ensures a second source of critical items
in case one firm fails or there is a national emergency.
This second sourcing is normally required for items affect-
ing the strategic forces or systems of the military. In
many cases this method is accomplished by utilizing tech-
nical data packages developed in the original contract and
competed in follow-on contracts.
e. Government Furnished Equipment
Another indirect method that the Government
uses to increase competition at the subcontract level is
through the use of Government Furnished Equipment (GF3).
This is essentially a method by which the Government con-
tracts directly with current subcontractors thus becoming
prime contractors. The prime contractor is allowed a degree
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of profit for his subcontract management efforts. If the
items are furnished GFE then the prime contractor loses
this profit. Two methods used by the Government to provide
GFS include the Component Breakout Policy and direct lic-
ensing.
Component breakout is a method for generating
production competition for procurement of components or sub-
systems. The Government screens a major contractor's make-
or-buy plan for high cost items. If any of these items
are being purchased on a non-competitive basis the Govern-
ment may consider competing them itself and providing them
to the prime contractor as GFE.
Although the Government has no privity of con-
tract with the subcontractor, it may approach the subcon-
tractor in an attempt to achieve a direct licensing agree-
ment. This agreement would, in fact, be a prime contract
for the firm to provide data and expertise to another firm
of the Government's choice in order to develop the other
firm into a source for the item. Because the subcontractor
usually demands a very high fee for this service and be-
cause it would increase the number of competitors he must
deal with, this is not a common practice,
f. Subcontract Clauses
DAR requires the following clauses in all
negotiated contracts over $10,000, except in Firm-Fixed-
Price contracts where award is on the basis of effective





The contractor shall select subcontractors (including
suppliers) on the competitive basis to the maximum
practical extent consistent with the objectives and re-
quirements of the contract, /_ 7 : 7- 1 01+ . if0__7
Although this clause is required, it leaves the option to
compete up to the prime contractor and basically states the
Governments preference for competition.
Other subcontract clauses required specifically
by DAP are the requirements for Government consent to sub-
contracts for fixed-price and cost type contracts, /~7:7-
10/+.23, 7-203. 8_7
g. Contract Type
The use of award-fee contracts is another
method currently being employed by the Government to achieve
competition. The Joint Cruise Missile Program is using
Cost-Plus-Award-Fee (CPAF) contracts with the award fee
based in part on the degree and extent of competition ob-
tained by the prime contractor. The prime contractors in
turn have used CPAF subcontracts with their major subcon-
tractors. The PCO felt that this type of contract gave the
prime contractor significant incentive to compete his sub-
contracts and the first tier subcontractors significant
incentive to compete their subcontracts.
This project office also used two other methods
to ensure competitive subcontracting. First, the contract-
ing personnel sat in on the prime contractor's bidder's con-
ferences and award conferences, and, although having no
legal position, felt that they influenced the prime
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contractor's decisions through their presence and awareness
of his alternatives. Secondly, the PCO retained some con-
tract administration duties in the project office instead
of delegating them to an ACO. He retained the right to
consent to subcontracts for major subcontracts feeling that
the Contract Administration Organization may not give them
sufficient attention. This gave the PCO more confidence in
the prime contractor's subcontracting efforts and encouraged
the prime contractor not to take any shortcuts since he
would be dealing with the project office and not a separate
organization,
if. Summary
It has been shown hov; the different actors in the
contracting cycle affect the amount of competition in sub-
contracting. The prime contractors have an influence
through their source selection policies, contract types,
and source development programs; the subcontractors influ-
ence competition through their marketing policies and their
product mix; and the Government influences competition
through the CPSP , consent to subcontracts, small business
policies, second sourcing, GFE, contract clauses, and con-
tract types.
C. PROBLEMS IN COMPETITIVE SUBCONTRACTING
There are several problem areas consistently encountered
in the attempt to achieve competitive subcontracting. These
problems are encountered by all three parties involved:
Government, prime contractors, and subcontractors. The
Gk

purpose of this section is to present some of these problems
as identified by the interviewees.
1 . Prime Contractor Problems
The prime contractors interviewed stated that they
faced problems in achieving competitive subcontracting in
three areas. These areas included finding competent sub-
contractors, evaluating "buy-ins", and Government use of
inflexible contracts. The following is a summary of their
comments.
a. Subcontractor Identification
Prime contractors claimed that they could not
always find enough sources willing to compete for Govern-
ment subcontracts. Some firms, whose business was primarily
with the commercial sector, did not want to comply with
Government requirements such as cost accounting standards
and reporting requirements which were substantially dif-
ferent than their established procedures. They resented
what they felt was undue Government monitoring of their
businesses. Prime contractors felt that there was little
that they could do to induce these firms into the Govern-
ment market.
In some areas, such as high technology and
complex systems, prime contractors stated that there was
very little entry of new business into the industry. This
was due to the high initial investment requirements, the
number of established firms already in the industry, and
the relatively small number of contracts available. They
felt that this also limited the competitive options.
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Prime contractors were generally unwilling to
invest in potential sources without a guaranteed return.
The only program in use by the Government to provide invest-
ment opportunities was in the small business area where
loans may be underwritten by the Small Business Administra-
tion. These guarantees were made only after contract award.
This post award guarantee was of little help in the prime
contractors' source evaluation process.
b. Buy-ins
Another problem that prime contractors faced in
obtaining competition was the "buy-in." The prime contract
tor has to be able to identify sources who are deliberately
underbidding in order to win a contract. Evaluation of
proposals and sources is a high cost, time consuming pro-
cedure, but if not properly done, may result in default of
the subcontractor and thereby problems for the prime con-
tractor. Prime contractors stated that in many cases, pro-
posals were received on the borderline between buy-in and
a reasonable bid. Prime contractors readily accepted the
buy-in from firms which had a good financial base but were
hesitant to accept these bids from firms with marginal
finances.
c. Prime Contracts
The increasing emphasis on fixed-price contracts
by the Government also was found to contribute to the lack
of competition by the prime contractors. The prime con-
tractors stated that the lack of flexibility inherent in
fixed-price contracts limited their subcontract options and
66

in some cases, reduced the number of available sources.
One prime contractor cited a case where the prime contract
reauired him to procure a small number (five) of complex
items which had been previously produced. The Government
would not consent to the use of a cost-type subcontract
since these items had been produced on three separate con-
tracts. The subcontractor considered the items to be high
risk production items and subsequently bid very high on a
fixed-price basis to cover the risk. Since the items were
essential, the subcontract was accepted at the high price.
The prime contractor estimated that the use of a cost-tyne
contract would have saved the Government 30-50% on these
items. Prime contractors felt that although the use of
fixed-price contracts fixed the amount of funds to be spent,
they could, in cases of complexity and limited sources,
drive up the total contract price.
2. Subcontractor Problems
Subcontractors interviewed stated that most of their
problems in being competitive stemmed from the prime contrac-
tors. All of the subcontractors interviewed contended that
if they maintained themselves in a competitive position,
able to compete with other firms, they would be at the
mercy of the prime contractors. If the prime contractor
could not achieve the terms that he desired from a specific
subcontractor, then he would go to other subcontractors
until he found one which would accept his terms. This
inferior position encouraged subcontractors to become sole-




Subcontractors agreed with the prime contractors
that there was a lack of capital available to help them to
increase their capabilities. They also stated that Govern-
ment regulations made business with the Government undesir-
able if a good commercial market were available.
One subcontractor cited a case of prejudiced
proposal evaluation by a prime contractor. The prime con-
tractor was a division of a major corporation. The PFQ
was submitted to eight sources including another division
of the corporation which needed the work. The subcontract
was awarded to the other division due to "superior technical
approach and manufacturing capability," The losing sub-
contractor had previously produced the item with no problems,
had the capability available, and underbid the winning
source. This subcontractor felt that the large corporations
considered much more than the best bid in their awards and
were not always proponents of competition.
3. Government Problems
The Government is also faced with a number of
problems in its policy to promote competitive subcontract-
ing. These problems stem from the inadequacies of existing
procedures and the lack of resources to do an extensive job.
The following problems were identified during research and
include: the lack of adequate subcontracting data, ineffi-
ciencies in CPS3
,
problems in consenting to subcontracts,
technical data packages, the effect of small business




Interviews conducted at various levels of DCD
exposed an apparent lack of concern over competition in
Government subcontracts. This was due in part to a lack
of data on the extent of subcontracting and the amount of
current subcontracts awarded competitively. Interviewees
at all levels, e.g., OFPP, DCD, Navy and Air Force Systems
Commands, Project Offices ; and local purchasing activities,
were highly confident in the relied on contract administra-
tion functions, such as CPSP and ACO consent procedures, to
ensure competitive subcontracting. Except for the DAP and
some Air Force Systems Command publications, there was a
lack of written procedures and policies throughout the spon-
soring commands to ensure that competition was being achiev-
ed and to monitor its extent. As an example, the Navy
Material Command (NMC) does not give specific direction to
its subordinate activities concerning procedures or goals
in competitive subcontracting. The Naval Supply Systems
Command also has no specific written guidance for its
Supply Centers or Regional Procurement Offices. The emphasis
in all of these organizations was on competitive prime con-
tracts and reliance on the CPSR and ACO consent.
b. CPSP
Although the CPSP concept is valid and useful
in some cases, its implementation has several deficiencies.
First of all, for a prime contractor to qualify for a CPSP,
its negotiated sales to the Government, including prime
contracts and subcontracts under Government prime contracts
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and including modifications to competitively awarded con-
tracts, should be expected to exceed $10,000,000 during a
twelve month period, /_ 7' : 23— 101J CPSPs are not required
by DAI? for specific contracts even if they exceed this
threshold. This threshold limits the number of firms to
largely major corporations and gives no consideration to
any prime contractors beneath the threshold. These other
contractors constitute a large percentage of Government
procurement dollars and may need to be monitored. The
threshold had been $5*000,000 until recently when it was
raised in order to compensate for inflation and reduced
manpower in the contract administration organizations.
There has been controversy over this increase within the
Federal Government. The DAR subcommittee on CPSP recommend-
ed that the threshold be maintained at $5*000,000 or even
lowered since most of the significant savings of the prog-
ram appeared to be realized in the lower range. The De-
fense Logistics Agency and DOD fought for the higher thres-
hold and won.
Another problem in relying on the CPSP by con-
tracting officers is the amount of time and manpower re-
quired to properly perform a CPSP. DCAS policy at this
time is to send a team of two persons to spend a total of
only two weeks at a prime contractor's plant to conduct
the review. The DOD Manual For Contractor Procurement
Systems Review contains seventy major areas of the contrac-
tor's purchasing system required to be reviewed. Sources
at DCAS acknowledge that there was no possible way for a
70

team of two to cover these areas in any detail in the time
allowed. The Air Force uses a four-five man team for three-
four weeks and the Navy varies significantly in its re-
sources for CPSP reviews from plant to plant,
A third element reducing the efficiency of the
CPSP is the personnel conducting the review. First of all,
there is no formal training program conducted. All training
is strictly on the job, leaving room for significant variance
in inspection standards. What one auditor may consider
competition another may not. There is also the problem of
regionalism. The same inspectors may cover a firm time
after time with no input of new ideas. There is no cross-
training between regions. The low rating of inspectors
(GS-11, GS-12) is another negative factor since they are
auditing a contractor's organization where the average per-
son they interface with earns 2.-3 times their salary. Many
prime contractors stated that they felt that these Govern-
ment personnel were not always qualified to tell them how
to run their business.
c. Consent to Subcontracts
Government consent to subcontracts was another
area presenting significant problems. Six current or former
ACOs were interviewed and stated that due to manpower, time,
and the large number of contracts under their cognizance,
their consents were primarily rubber stamps. The only
areas even checked by two ACCs were if the proposed subcon-
tractor had a good business rating in Standard and Poor.
None of the ACOs interviewed had ever been involved in
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withholding consent for any subcontract.
The "rubber stamp" experience was alluded to
by several of the prime contractors interviewed. Due to
this perception, it was found that in many cases the prime
contractor proceeded with the proposed subcontract and
obtained Government consent after the fact. Prime contrac-
tors justified this by citing the long delays which would
result if they waited for each consent action and the
apparent lack of concern by the Government personnel who
rubber stamped the proposals anyway.
In the contracting offices visited contracting
officers did not trust the ACOs to do a good job in making
the determination to consent to subcontracts in all cases,
recognizing that the AGO was burdened by a large number of
contracts and that he could not give special attention to
each. To counter this, most major project offices keep
as much consent responsibility in their own offices as
possible and, when the load is too large, keep only the
larger and most critical subcontracts in-house.
d. Technical Data Packages
Another area that presents problems is in the
data packages supplied by subcontractors. A subcontractor
might not choose to agree to supply a data package if he
is in competition with the prime contractor on similar
work. He also may not want to submit the data package if
he feels that the prime contractor may use it to compete
against him in a follow-on contract. Several large cor-
porations were cited by one PCO as having used the data
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package supplied by the subcontractor to compete against
that subcontractor. One firm specifically changed its make-
or-buy plan in additional prime contracts to fabricate an
item which it had previously subcontracted and gained the
data rights for. This type of action discourages subcon-
tractors from providing adequate, if any, data and encour-
ages the development of sole sources.
Data packages themselves are not always suffi-
cient or complete enough to use to achieve competition.
In many cases, manufacturing techniques vary as well as
interpretation of specifications. Two firms can build
from the same specifications and get two completely dif-
ferent products. Some subcontractors have been known to
leave critical gaps in their data packages in an attempt
to maintain a competitive edge.
e. Small Business
The changes in the mandatory small business
laws are presenting some new problems in competitive sub-
contracting. First, prime contractors feel that there is
an excessive burden on them to identify small and minority
business concerns before contract award. The search effort
is costly and time consuming especially if the contract is
not guaranteed. Secondly, they are skeptical about the
requirement for goals, particularly the basis upon which
they will be determined and the qualifications of the
Government personnel involved in setting them. Prime con-
tractors interviewed agreed that this program will have
significant impact on the cost of prime contracts.
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Government contracting personnel interviewed
stated that the new small business requirements would in-
crease contract costs and probably slow down the procure-
ment cycle. They cited the longer time required to identify
sources and the increased administrative burden of con-
ducting this program as the causes.
A recent GAO study on the mandatory small
business subcontracting policy identified the following
problems
:
-the lack of a clear and consistent definition for the
term "subcontract" in solicitations and contracts;
-the difficulties with using incentives to increase small
business subcontracting
-the refusal and potential refusal of normal suppliers
to bid on procurements for commercial items; and
-the procuring activities lack of adequate data and
methodology to prepare goals for inclusion in solici-
tations which would increase small business subcontract-
ing. L3'2j
Although the DAR has recently been changed to include this
new policy, it has not addressed these specific problems.
The current DAP policy is included in Appendix D.
What the above problems do to the competitive
intent of this policy are (1) confuse the definition of
subcontract leaving an opening for prime contractors to
avoid the rules, (2) cause mistrust and confusion on the
part of both prime contractors and subcontractors, and
(3) allow room for confusion and error in the preparation
and evaluation of goals. This policy could deter both
prime contractors and subcontractors from entering into
contracts with the Government according to several

Government contracting personnel interviewed,
f. Standardization
Another area which presents a problem in com-
peting subcontracts is the Government's policy for standardi-
zation in the military. Standardization is desired in
order to allow greater flexibility and interchangeability
between military equipments and systems. Parts from one
tank should be able to be used to fix another tank. This
allows a more efficient system of repair parts and allows
purchases on a scale where cost savings may be realized.
Competing subcontracts, especially for follow-on contracts,
provides the means for more than one manufacturer to supply
a specific part. Even using the same specifications, these
parts may not be compatible or interchangeable. The desire
for competition must, therefor, be weighed against the
desire for standardization.
An example of an approach used to eliminate
this problem in the Navy shipbuilding program is that used
for the FFG-7 class ships. According to the PCO, tradition-
ally major equipments subcontracted within the same ship
class could come from different subcontractors and be
potentially incompatable. This was due to competing the
contracts as each new group of ships was authorized. In
an attempt to maintain competition in the initial stages
and maintain standardization throughout production, the
FFG-7 program has used a concept of standardized option
equipment. In the original PFP, forty-two pieces of equip-
ment were identified to be contractor furnished equipment
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required to be identical. The contractor then negotiated
with the potential subcontractors on the basis of an option
for forty of each of the items. The contract was awarded
to Bath Iron Works (BI'.V). Another prime contract was award-
ed to Todd Shipyards but they were directed to use the same
subcontractors at the prices and terms quoted to 3IV/. To
date there have been no problems with the subcontractors
and the project office is considering extending the option
for more ships.
4. Summary
It has been shown that there are many problems to be
faced by all of the actors in the acquisition process in the
attempt to achieve competitive subcontracting. The prime
contractor faces Government requirements, inadequate sources,
and potential buy-ins. The subcontractor faces the diffi-
culty of Government requirements, prime contractor pressures,
and the pressure to ensure a market. The Government faces
the problems of fine tuning its own programs, staffing its
activities, and encouraging the prime contractors and sub-
contractors to compete.
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter has described the nature of competition at
the subcontract level, the programs and procedures used by
prime contractors, subcontractors, and the Government to
achieve competitive subcontracting, and the problems encount-
ered by each. The following chapter will identify conces-








The extent of competitive subcontracting is unknown.
It is impossible to determine the extent of competitive sub-
contracting from the information currently available from
the Government and industry. There is no required reporting
system in use by the Government to monitor where and on what
basis subcontracts are awarded. There is confusion and dis-
agreement between the definitions of competition as used by
Government and industry causing even the few statistics
available to be unuseable. Government programs such as CPSR
and consent to subcontracts are also unreliable sources of
general subcontracting data since they do not extend to all
subcontracts and have serious manning and implementation
problems. Although most of the prime contractors' purchas-
ing practices have been shown to be competitive, it has also
been shown that in some cases non-competitive practices
were either used or had the potential to be used. It cannot
be assumed therefore, that competition is always used.
2. There exist a number of pressures in the procurement
cycle against the increases of competitive subcontracting.
Prime contractors feel that there already exists sufficient
competition in their subcontracts and that any more Govern-
ment interferences or direction could result in higher
prices and slower deliveries. Prime contractors also point
out that increased emphasis on competition increases the
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possibility of buy-ins and subcontract failures.
Subcontractors are not always willing to support the need
for competitive subcontracting. Many subcontractors are not
willing to perform or bid on Government subcontracts due to
the added requirements that the Government imposes. They
prefer to deal with the commercial market if available.
Most subcontractors also prefer the role of a sole-source
to ensure a market for their products and to achieve a
better bargaining position with prime contractors. The more
sources available for an item the less chance that a par-
ticular subcontractor will be able to win a particular
subcontract.
Although the Government policy is for the use of com-
petition in subcontracting, there is also a desire for
standardization in most military systems. While this in
itself is not counter-competitive, if the parts of a system
were competed each time a new order was authorized there
would probably result a decrease in standardization.
3. The Government can both directly and indirectly
influence the amount of competitive subcontracting. The
Government is able to influence the amount of competitive
subcontracting through contract types, contract clauses,
and contract administration. The use of flexible contracts
such as cost-type contracts, allows the prime contractor
more flexibility in attracting potential sources. Contract
clauses requiring the prime contractor to compete his pur-
chases are used. The requirements for CPS3 and Government
consent to subcontracts are methods by which the Government
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can monitor the prime contractor's compliance with competi-
tive policies. The Government can use award- fee type con-
tracts and base the award fee partially on the amount of
competition achieved by the prime contractor. The deter-
menation of final contract price can be influenced by the
Government depending upon the prime contractor's performance
of clause requirements relating to competition. Thus it can
be seen that the Government influences competitive subcon-
tracting through the terms of the original contract and
through the process of administering that contract and
determining price,
it. Although the Government's monitoring systems and
objectives are sound, they do not always ensure competition.
Although DAP clauses direct that subcontracts be awarded on
a competitive basis, most Government contracting personnel
depend on the CPSP and the Government's right to consent to
subcontracts as the primary means to monitor the prime con-
tractor's compliance with these clauses. It has been shown
that CPSPs are deficient in the number of firms covered,
the high threshold to qualify for a review, the lack of
properly trained personnel to conduct them, and the var-
iances in the inspection between cognizant performing
activities. The policy of Government consent to subcontracts
has also been shown to be inadequate due to the large number
of contracts monitored by each ACO, the lack of personnel
and time at the CAOs , the separation between the PCO and the
ACO, and the prime contractor's desire to proceed with sub-
contracts prior to consent. The deficiencies in these
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programs allow significant room for non-competitive practices,
5. The need to increase competitive subcontracting is
not apparent. Although the Government's policy is to use
competition as the primary means of source selection, the
need to increase the current amount of competition at the
subcontract level is not apparent. Until the extent of
competitive subcontracting is determined, it would be illog-
ical to require that it be increased. Most concern ex-
pressed by Government officials about the need to increase
competitive Government subcontracting stems from the lack
of subcontracting data available to Government policy makers
and could prove to be unnecessary if it were determined that
sufficient competition was being achieved by the prime con-
tractors.
3 . RE COMMENDATI ONS
1 . Initiate a Government subcontracting report. In
order to determine whether or not there is a need for more
Government action to ensure competitive subcontracting,
there needs to be a method for determining the current extent
of competition. A clause could be developed for all Govern-
ment prime contracts requiring the prime contractor to
report the basis upon which subcontract awards have been
made. The report could go from the prime contractor to a
specified CAO via the contracting office for consolidation
with statistics from other contractors. In order for this
to work, there would have to be specific definitions of
subcontract, subcontractor, and adequate competition
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included in the clause. The report should include factors
such as number of firms solicited, number of responses,
evaluation factors and weights, reason for award, and justi-
fication of sole source or inadequate competition. These
reports could be monitored by the cognizant CAO and would
not preclude the need for CFSRs and Government consent to
subcontracts. What the report would accomplish would be to
determine if any Government actions were required in this
area. Failure to comply with the reporting system could
result in reductions of final prime contract prices.
The major difficulties with this system would be the
addition to the costs of individual contracts and the added
work load for already overburdened Government contracting
offices. Prime contractors would charge high costs for the
reporting burden but these costs could eventually be re-
covered if action were taken to increase the percentage of
competitive awards. The lack of personnel is a primary
reason why current Government subcontracting programs are
inadequate. Although this program would increase the work-
load requirement, it may result in actions which would re-
duce the need for ACQ consent through implementation of
other programs or reduction of current requirements if
competition is found to be adequate or better.
2. Develop a mandatory competitive subcontracting
clause. If it is determined that more competition is
necessary or desirable in Government subcontracts, the only
method of ensuring that there will be compliance to the
Government's policy is through the use of a mandatory
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subcontracting clause in all prime contracts. This clause
should require that all subcontracts be awarded on a com-
petitive basis. Reporting and close monitoring of subcon-
tracts would then be necessary only for the exceptions to
this policy thereby reducing CAO workload. The clause
should include the definitions of subcontract, subcontrac-
tor, and adequate competition to ensure uniform compliance.
Monitoring the performance of this policy could take place
through a modified CPSR which would include a review of all
prime contractors over a threshold much reduced from the
current Si 0,000,000. Centralization of the responsibility
for CPSR would also assist in the uniform implementation of
this goal. Penalties for non-compliance could be affected
against final contract price and future contract awards.
This clause would also be costly to implement. Prime
contractors would probably add in a cost to comply with the
clause even if they were already complying with the policy.
The potential benefit for the Government could be derived
if the savings realized by increased competition were •
greater than the cost of implementation of the clause.
C. CONTRIBUTION OF THE STUDY
This study was undertaken to identify the nature of
competition at the subcontract level and to surface the
problems currently being encountered in achieving this com-
petition. It has been shown that subcontracts account for
a significant portion of the Federal procurement dollar and
that contracting officers should be aware of the manner in
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which prime contractors use this money. It is hoped that
contracting officers reading this study can derive some
ideas on how to motivate their prime contractors to compete
their subcontracts and potentially save the Government some
money while procuring quality items.
D. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
IWhile performing research on this topic, several related
topics were encountered which may warrant further research.
These included:
(1) A thorough analysis of the subcontracting procedure
as used in the Navy's FFG-7 program due to its unique sub-
contracting policies.
(2) The desirability of direct Government funding of
potential subcontractors to increase their capabilities.
(3) The consolidation of the CPSR under one Govern-
ment agency.






The following is a sample of the questions used by the
researcher in conducting interviews with prime contractors,
subcontractors, and Government personnel. These Questions
were used to lead the discussions with interviewees.
PRIMS CONTRACTORS
What percentage of your subcontracts are sole source?
Competitive?
What steps do you take to eliminate sole sources?
Describe your source selection policy and procedures
Define competition.
How do you know that you are achieving adeauate competit-
ion?
Which items are easiest to compete?
Who are your typical subcontractors?
Do you feel that you are achieving sufficient competition?
What factors determine whether you compete a subcontract?
What problems do you encounter from subcontractors when
attempting to compete? The Government?
Do you have a source development program?
How is the Government encouraging you to compete sub-
contracts?
What actions could the Government take to assist you or
make it easier for you to obtain competition?
SUBCONTRACTORS




Are you a sole source? Why?
How do you develop your markets?
What do you do to become competitive?
Do you feel that there is sufficient competition?
What problems does competitive subcontracting present to
subcontractors?
What Government and prime contractor policies are you aware
of in the area of competitive subcontracting? What prob-
lems do these cause?
What actions would you recommend for the Government to
increase competitive subcontracting?
GOVERNMENT
Government contracting personnel v/ere asked:
What percentage of your subcontracts are awarded compet-
itively?
How do you motivate the prime contractors to compete their
subcontracts?
What directions and goals are you given by Government
policy makers?
Do you become involved in Government consent to subcon-
tracts? How?
What do you consider as adequate competition?
What problems do you encounter in achieving competitive
subcontracting?
What policies or changes would enable you to increase the
amount of competition?
Government CPSR personnel were asked:
How does CPSP help to encourage subcontract competition?
How effective is the CPSR?
What problems have been encountered in the implementation
of the CPSP program?
Government policy makers v/ere asked:
How much competitive subcontracting is there?
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What policies have been implemented to encourage competi-
tive subcontracting?
What direction has been given to your subordinate commands?
What actions are currently contemplated?





EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON. DC. 20503
April 5, 1976 CIRCULAR NO. A-109
TO THE HEADS OF EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS AND ESTABLISHMENTS
SUBJECT: Major System Acquisitions
le Purpose . This Circular establishes policies, to be
followed b~y executive branch agencies in the acquisition of
major systems.
2. Background . The acquisition of major systems by the
Federal Government constitutes one of the most crucial and
expensive activities performed to meet national needs. Its
impact is critical on technology/ on the Nation's economic
and fiscal policies, and on the accomplishment of Government
agency missions in such fields as defense, space, energy and
transportation. For a number of years, there has been deep
concern over the effectiveness of the management of major
system acquisitions. The report of the Commission on
Government Procurement recommended basic changes to improve
the process of acquiring major systems. This Circular is




3. Responsibility . Each agency head has the responsibility
to ensure that the provisions of this Circular are followed.
This Circular provides administrative direction to heads of
agencies and does not establish and shall not be construed
to create any substantive or procedural basis for any person
to challenge any agency action or inaction on the basis that
such action was not in accordance with this Circular.
4. Coverage . This Circular covers and applies to:
a. Management of the acquisition of major systems,
including: ° Analysis of agency missions ° Determination of
mission needs • Setting of program objectives
Determination of system requirements °
planning ° Budgeting ° Funding ° Research
Development ° Testing and evaluation








of the system into use or otherwise successful achievement
of program objectives.
b. All programs for the acquisition of major systems
even though:
(1) The system is one-of-a-kind.
(2) The agency's involvement in the system is
limited to the development of demonstration hardware for
optional use by the private sector rather than for the
agency's own use.
5. Definitions . As used in this Circular:
a. Executive agency (hereinafter referred to as agency)
means an executive department, and an independent
establishment within the meaning of sections 101 and 104 (1>,
respectively, of Title 5, United States Code.
b. Agency component means a major organizational
subdivision of an agency. For example: The Army, Navy, Air
Force, and Defense Supply Agency are agency components of
the Department of Defense. The Federal Aviation
Administration, Urban Mass Transportation Administration,
and the Federal Highway Administration are agency components
of the Department of Transportation. '
c. Agency missions means those responsibilities for
meeting national needs assigned to a specific agency.
d. Mission need means a required capability within an
agency's overall purpose, including cost and schedule
considerations
.
e. Program objectives means the capability, cost and
3chedule goals being sought by the system acquisition
program in response to a mission need.
f. Program means' an organized set of activities
lirected toward a common purpose, objective, or goal
undertaken or proposed by an agency in order to carry out
responsibilities assigned to it.
g. System design concept means an idea expressed in
:erms of ' general performance, capabilities, and




operate or to be operated as an integrated whole in meeting
a mission need.
h. Major system means that combination of elements that
will function together to produce the capabilities required
to fulfill a mission need. The elements may include, for
example, hardware, equipment, software, construction, or
other improvements or real property. Major system
acquisition programs are those programs that (1) are
directed at and critical to fulfilling an agency mission,
(2) entail the allocation of relatively large resources, and
(3) warrant special management attention. Additional
criteria and relative dollar thresholds for the
determination of agency programs to be considered major
#
systems under the purview of this Circular, may be'
established at the discretion of the agency head.
i. System acquisition process means the sequence of
acquisition activities starting from the agency's
reconciliation of its mission needs, with its capabilities,
priorities and resources, and extending through the
introduction of a system into operational use or the
otherwise successful achievement of program objectives.
3* Life cycle cost means the sum total of the direct,
indirect, recurring, nonrecurring, and other related costs
incurred, or estimated to be incurred, in the design,
development, production, operation, maintenance and support
of a major system over its anticipated useful life span.
6. General policy . The policies of this Circular are
designed to assure the effectiveness and efficiency of the
process of acquiring major systems. They are based on the




Express ne><=>c\s and program objectives in mission
terms and not equipment terms to encourage innovation_and
CQinpetition in c
^
ea ^ing_/ exploring, _ana IjSayg.loping
alternative system Hesign concepts^.
b. Place emphasis on the initial activities of the
system acquisition process to allow competitive exploration
of alternative system design concepts in response to mission
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c. Communicate with Congress early in the system
acquisition process by relating major system acquisition
programs to agency mission needs. This communication should
follow the requirements of Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) Circular No. A-10 concerning information related to
budget estimates and related materials.
d. Establish clear lines of authority, responsibility,
and accountability for management of major system
acquisition programs. Utilize appropriate managerial levels
in decisionmaking, and obtain agency head approval at key
decision points in the evolution of each acquisition
program.
e. Designate a focal point responsible for integrating
and unifying the system acquisition management process and
monitoring policy implementation.
f. RfiLly__on private industry in accordance with the
policy established by OMB Circular No. A-76.
7. Major system acquisition management objectives . Each
agency acquiring major systems should:
a. Ensure that each major system: Fulfills a mission
leed. Operates effectively in its intended environment.
Demonstrates a level of performance and reliability that
justifies the allocation of the Nation's limited resources
for its acquisition and ownership.
b. Depend on, whenever economically beneficial,
competition between similar or differing system design
concepts throughout the entire acquisition process.
c. Ensure appropriate trade-off among investment costs,
Dwnership costs, schedules, and performance characteristics.
d. Provide strong checks and balances by ensuring
adequate system test and evaluation. Conduct such tests and
evaluation independent, where practicable, of developer and
aser
.
e. Accomplish system acquisition planning, built on
analysis of agency missions, which implies appropriate





f. Tailor an acquisition strategy ror each program, as
soon as the agency decides to solicit alternative system
design concepts, that could lead to the acquisition of a new
major system and refine the strategy as the program proceeds
through the acquisition process. Encompass test and
evaluation criteria and business maragement considerations
in the strategy. The strategy could typically include: °
Use of the contracting process as an important tool in the
acquisition program ° Scheduling of essential elements of
the acquisition process ° Demonstration, test, and
evaluation criteria ° Content of solicitations for proposals
Decisions on whom to solicit ° Methods for obtaining and
sustaining competition ° Guidelines for the evaluation and
acceptance or rejection of proposals ° Goals for design-to-
ccst ° Methods for projecting life cycle costs ° Use of data
rights ° Use of warranties ° Methods for analyzing and
evaluating contractor and Government risks ° Need for
developing contractor incentives ° Selection of the type of
contract best suited for each stage in the acquisition
process ° Administration of contracts.
g. Maintain a capability to: ° Predict, review, assess,
negotiate and monitor costs for system development,
enc;ir Bering, design, demonstration, test, production,
operation and support (i.e., life cycle costs) ° Assess
acquisition cost, schedule and performance experience
a. tinst predictions, and provide such assessments for
consideration by the agency head at key decision points
Make new assessments where significant costs, schedule or
performance variances occur ° Estimate life cycle costs
during system design concept evaluation and selection, full-
scale development, facility conversion, and production, to
ensure appropriate trade-offs among investment costs,
ownership costs, schedules, and performance Use
independent cost estimates, where feasible, for comparison
purposes
.
8. Management structure .
a. The head of each agency that acquires major systems
will designate an acquisition executive to integrate and
unify the management process for the agency's major system
acquisitions and to monitor implementation of the policies
and practices set forth in this Circular.
b. Each agency that acquires—or is responsible for




establish clear lines of authority/ responsibility, and
accountability for management of its major system
acquisition programs.
c. Each agency should preclude management layering and
placing nonessential reporting procedures and paperwork
requirements on program managers and contractors.
d. A program manager will be designated for each of the
agency's major system acquisition programs. This
designation should be made when a decision is made to
fulfill a mission need by pursuing alternative system design
concepts. It is essential that the program manager have an
understanding of user needs and constraints, familiarity-
with development principles, and requisite management skills
and experience. Ideally, management skills and experience
would include: ° Research and development ° Operations °
Engineering ° Construction ° Testing ° Contracting °
Prototyping and fabrication of complex systems ° Production
Business ° Budgeting ° Finance. With satisfactory
performance, the tenure of the program manager should be
long enough to provide continuity and personal
accountability.
e. Upon designation, the program manager should be
given budget guidance and a written charter of his
authority, responsibility, and accountability for
accomplishing approved program objectives.
f. Agency technical management and Government
laboratories should be considered for participation in
agency mission analysis, evaluation of alternative system
design concepts, and support of all development, test, and
evaluation efforts.
g. Agencies are encouraged to work with each other to
foster technology transfer, prevent unwarranted duplication
of technological efforts, reduce system costs, promote
standardization, and help create and maintain a competitive
environment for an acquisition.
9. Key decisions . Technical and program decisions normally
will be made at the level of the agency component or
operating activity. However, the following four key





a. Identification and definition of a specific mission
need to be fulfilled, the relative priority assigned within
the agency, and the general magnitude of resources that may
be invested.
b. Selection of competitive system design concepts to
be advanced to a test/demonstration phase or authorization
to proceed with the development of a noncompetitive (single
concept) system.
c. Commitment of a system to full-scale development and
limited production.
d. Commitment of a system to full production.
10. Determination of mission needs .
a. Determination of mission need should be based on an
analysis of an agency's mission reconciled with overall
capabilities, priorities and resources. When analysis of an
agency's mission shows that a need for a new major system
exists, such a need should not be defined in equipment
terms, but should be defined in terms of the mission,
purpose, capability, agency components involved, schedule
and cost objectives, and operating constraints. A mission
need may result from a deficiency in existing agency
capabilities or the decision to establish new capabilities
in response to a technologically feasible opportunity.
Mission needs are independent of any particular system or
technological solution.
b. Where an agency has more than one component
involved, the agency will assign the roles and
responsibilities of each component at the time of the first
key decision. The agency may permit two or more agency
components to sponsor competitive system design concepts in
order to foster innovation and competition.
c. Agencies should, as required to satisfy mission
responsibilities, contribute to. the technology base,
effectively utilizing both the private sector and Government
laboratories and in-house technical centers, by conducting,
supporting, or sponsoring: ° Research ° System design
concept studies ° Proof of concept work * Exploratory
subsystem development ° Tests and evaluations. Applied
technology efforts oriented to system developments should be




11. Alternative systems .
a. Alternative system design concepts will be explored
within the context of the agency's mission need and program
objectives—with emphasis on generating innovation and
conceptual competition from industry. Benefits to be
derived should be optimized by competitive exploration of
alternative system design concepts , and trade-offs of
capability, schedule, and cost. Care should be exercised
during the initial steps of the acquisition process not to
conform mission needs or program objectives to any known
systems or products that might foreclose consideration of
alternatives
.
b. Alternative system design concepts will be solicited
from a broad base of qualified firms. In order to achieve
the most preferred system solution, emphasis will be placed
on innovation and competition. To this end, participation
of smaller and newer businesses should be encouraged.
Concepts will be primarily solicited from private industry;
and when beneficial to the Government, foreign technology,
and equipment may be considered.
c. Federal laboratories, federally funded research and
development centers, educational institutions, and other
not-for-profit organizations may also be considered as
sources for competitive system design concepts. Ideas,
concepts, or technology, developed by Government
laboratories or at Government expense, may be made available
to private industry through the procurement process or
through other established procedures. Industry proposals
may be made on the basis of these ideas, concepts, and
technology or on the basis of feasible alternatives which
the proposer considers superior.
d. Research and development efforts should emphasize
early competitive exploration of alternatives, as relatively
inexpensive insurance against premature or preordained
choice of a system that may prove to be either more costly
or less effective.
e. Requests for alternative system design concept
proposals will explain the mission need, schedule, cost,
capability objectives, and operating constraints. Each
offeror will be free to propose his own technical approach,
r.iain design features, subsystems, and alternatives to




leas than full-scale development stages, contractors should
not be restricted by detailed Government specifications and
standards
.
f. Selections from competing system design concept
proposals will be based on a review by a team of experts,
preferably from inside and outside the responsible component
development organization. Such a review will consider: (1)
Proposed system functional and performance capabilities to
meet mission needs and program objectives, including
resources required and benefits to be derived by trade-offs,
where feasible, among technical performance, acquisition
costs, ownership costs, time to develop and procure; and (2)
The relevant accomplishment record of competitors.
g. During the uncertain period of identifying and
exploring alternative system design concepts, contracts
covering relatively short time periods at planned dollar
levels will be used. Timely technical reviews of
alternative system design concepts will be made to effect
the orderly elimination of those least attractive.
h. Contractors should be provided with operational test
conditions, mission performance criteria, and life cycle
cost factors that will be used by the agency in the
evaluation and selection of the system (s) for full-scale
development and production.
i. The participating contractors should be provided
with relevant operational and support experience through the
program manager, as necessary, in developing performance and
other requirements for each alternative system design
concept as tests and trade-offs are made.
j . Development of subsystems that are intended to be
included in a major system acquisition program will be
restricted to less than fully designed hardware (full-scale
development) until the subsystem is identified as a part of
a system candidate for full-scale development. Exceptions
may be authorized by the agency head if the subsystems are
long lead time items that fulfill a recognized generic need
or if they have a high potential for common use among




12 . Demonstrations .
a. Advancement to a competitive test/demonstration
phase may be approved when the agency's mission need and
program objectives are reaffirmed and when alternative
system design concepts are selected.
b. Major system acquisition programs will be structured
and resources planned to demonstrate and evaluate competing
alternative system design concepts that have been selected.
Exceptions may be authorized by the agency head if
demonstration is not feasible.
c. Development of a single system design concept that
has not been competitively selected should be considered
only if justified by factors such as urgency of need, or by
the physical and financial impracticality of demonstrating
alternatives. Proceeding with the development of a
noncompetitive (single concept) system may be authorized
(
by
the agency head. Strong agency program management and
technical direction should be used for systems that have
been neither competitively selected nor demonstrated.
|3' Full - scale development and production .
a. Full-scale development, including limited
production, may be approved when the agency's mission need
and program objectives are reaffirmed and competitive
demonstration results verify that the chosen system design
concept(s) is sound.
b. Full production may be approved when the agency's
mission need and program objectives are reaffirmed and when
system performance has been satisfactorily tested,
independent of the agency development and user
organizations, and evaluated in an environment that assures
demonstration in expected operational conditions.
Exceptions to independent testing may be authorized by the
agency head under such circumstances as physical or
financial impracticability or extreme urgency.
c. Selection of a system (a) and contractor (s) for full-
scale development and production is to be made on the basis
of (1) system performance measured against current mission
need and program objectives, (2) an evaluation of estimated





contractor (s) demonstrated management, financial, and
technical capabilities to meet program objectives.
d. The program manager will monitor system tests and
contractor progress in fulfilling system performance, cost,
and schedule commitments. Significant actual or forecast
variances will be brought to the attention of the
appropriate management authority for corrective action.
14. Budgeting and financing . Beginning with FY 1979 all
agencies will , as part of the budget process, present
budgets in terms of agency missions in consonance with
Section 201 (i) of the Budget and Accounting Act, 1921, as
added by Section 601 of the Congressional Budget Act of
1974, and in accordance with OMB Circular A-ll. In so
doing, the agencies are desired to separately identify
research and development funding for: (1) The general
technology base in support of the agency's overall missions,
(2) The specific development efforts in support of
alternative system design concepts to accomplish each
mission need, and (3) Full-scale developments. Each agency
should ensure that research and development is not
undesirably duplicated across its missions.
15. Information to Congress .
a. Procedures for this purpose will be developed in
conjunction with the Office of Management and Budget and the
various committees of Congress having oversight
responsibility for agency activities. Beginning with FY
1979 budget each agency will inform Congress in the normal
budget process about agency missions, capabilities,
deficiencies, and needs and objectives related to
acquisition programs, in consonance with Section 601 (i) of
the Congressional Budget Act of 1974.
b. Disclosure of the basis for an agency decision to
proceed with a single system design concept without
competitive selection and demonstration will be made to the
congressional authorization and appropriation committees.
16. Implementation All agencies will work closely with the
Office of" Management and Budget in resolving all
implementation problems.
17. Submissions to Office of Management and Budget .





a. Policy directives, regulations, and guidelines as
they are issued.
b. Within six months after the date of this Circular, a
time-phased action plan for meeting the requirements of this
Circular.
c. Periodically, the agency approved exceptions
permitted under the provisions of this Circular.
This information will be used by the OMB, in identifying
major system acquisition trends and in monitoring
implementations of this policy.
18
. Inquiries . All questions or inquiries should be
submitted to the OMB, Administrator for Federal Procurement
Policy. Telephone number, area code, 202-395-4677.
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CONTRACT CLAUSES AND SOLICITATION PROVISIONS
(b) In accordance with 1-707. 3(b), insert the following
clause m negotiated contracts.
SUBCONTRACTING PLAN FOR SMALL BUSINESS AND SMALL _DISADVAN-
TAGED BUSINESS CONCERNS (NEGOTIATED) (1979 JULY)
(a) The apparent successful offeror, upon request by the
contracting officer, shall submit and negotiate a subcontracting
plan which addresses separately subcontracting with small
business concerns and small disadvantaged business concerns
and which shall be included in and made a material part of
the resultant contract. The subcontracting plan shall be
negotiated within the time specified by the contracting
officer. Failure to submit and negotiate the subcontract-
ing plan shall make the offeror ineligible for award of a
contract. As a minimum, the subcontracting plan shall
include
—
(1) Separate percentage goals (expressed in terms of
percentage of total planned subcontracting dollars) for the
utilization as subcontractors of small business concerns




the purposes of the subcontracting plan, the contractor
shall include all first tier subcontracts to be awarded in
performance of this contract, including a proportionate share
of products, services, etc., whose costs are normally allo-
cated as indirect or overhead costs when reasonably deter-
mined to be attributable to this contract.
(2) The name of an individual within the employ of the
offeror who will administer the subcontracting plan of the
offeror and a description of the duties of such individual;
(3) A description of the efforts the offeror will make to
assure that small business and small disadvantaged business
concerns will have an equitable opportunity to compete for
subcontracts
;
(4) Assurances that the offeror will include the clause
entitles Utilization of Small Business and Small Disadvantaged
Business Concerns in all subcontracts which offer further sub-
contracting opportunities and will require all subcontractors
(except small business concerns) who receive subcontracts in
excess of $500,000, or in the case of a contract for the con-
struction of any public facility, $1 million, to adopt a plan
in consonance with this clause;
7-104.14
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(5) Assurances that the offeror will submit such periodic
reports and cooperate in any studies or surveys as may be re-
quired by the contracting agency or the Small Business Admini-
stration in order to determine the extent of compliance by the
offeror with the subcontracting plan; and
(6) A recitation of the types of records the offeror
will maintain to demonstrate procedures which have been
adopted to comply with the requirements and goals set forth in
the plan, including the establishment of source lists of
small business and small disadvantaged business concerns;
and efforts to identify and award subcontracts to such small
business concerns.
(b) In order to effectively implement this plan the con-
tractor shall
:
(1) Issue and promulgate company wide policy statements
in support of this effort, develop written procedures and
work instructions, and assign specific responsibilities re-
garding requirements of this clause.
(2) Demonstrate continuing management interest and involve-
ment in support of this effort through such actions as regular
reviews of progress and establishment of overall corporate and
divisional goals and ob]ectives.
(3) Train and motivate conpractor personnel regarding the
support of small and small disadvantaged business firms.
(4) Assist small business and small disadvantaged business
concerns by arranging solicitations, time for the preparation
of bids, quantities, specifications, and delivery schedules so
as to facilitate the participation by such concerns. Where the
Contractor's lists of potential small business and disadvantaged
subcontractors are excessively long, reasonable effort shall be
made to give ail such small business concerns an opportunity to
compete over a period of time.
(5) Provide adequate and timely consideration of the potential'
ities of small business and sma.il disadvantaged business concerns
in all "make-or-buy" decisions.
(6) Counsel and discuss subcontracting opportunities with
representatives of small and small disadvantaged business firms as
are referred by the Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization
Specialist responsible for monitoring performance under this pro-
gram and representatives of the SBA.
(c) The contractor shall submit DD Form 1140-1 in accord-
ance with instructions provided on the form.
(d) The offeror understands that:
(1) An acceptable plan must, in the determination of the
contracting officer, provide the maximum practicable oppor-
tunity for small business and small disadvantaged business
concerns to participate in the performance of the contract.
7-104.14
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(2) The contracting officer shall notify the contractor in
writxng of has reasons for determining a subcontracting plan
to be unacceptable. Such notice shall be given early enough
in the negotiation process to allow the contractor sufficient
time to modify the plan within the time limits prescribed.
(3) Prior compliance of the offeror with other such sub-
contracting plans under previous contracts will be considered
by the contracting officer in determining the responsibility
of the offeror for award of the contract.
(4) Subcontracting plans are not required of small busi-
ness concerns.
(5) The failure of any contractor or subcontractor to
comply in good faith with (i) the clause entitled Utilization
of Small Business and Small Disadvantaged Business Concerns
or (ii) an approved plan required by this Small Business and
Small Disadvantaged Business Subcontracting Plan (Negotiated)
provision, will be a material breach of such contract or sub-
contract.
(End of clause)
(c) In accordance with 1-707. 3(c) , insert the following clause
in formally advertised contracts.
SUBCONTRACTING PLAN FOR SMALL BUSINESS AND SMALL DISADVANTAGED
BUSINESS CONCERNS (FORMALLY ADVERTISED) (1979
(a) The apparent low bidder, upon request by the contracting
officer, shall submit a subcontracting plan which addresses
separately subcontracting with small business concerns and
small disadvantaged business concerns, and which shall be in-
cluded in and made a material part of the resultant contract.
The subcontracting plan shall be submitted within the time
specified by the contracting officer. Failure to submit the
subcontracting plan shall make the bidder ineligible for the
award of a contract.
As a minimum, the subcontracting plan shall include:
(1) Separate percentage goals (expressed in terms of per-
centage of total planned subcontracting dollars) for the uti-
lization as subcontractors of small business concerns and small
• business concerns owned and controlled by socially and economically
disadvantaged individuals; for the purposes of the subcontracting
plan, the contractor shall include all first tier subcontracts
to be awarded in performance of this contract, including a
proportionate share of products, services, etc., whose costs
are normally allocated as indirect or overhead costs when
reasonably determined to be attributable to this contract.
7-104.14
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(2) The name of an individual within the employ of the bid-
der who will administer the subcontracting plan of the bidder
and a description of the duties of such individual;
(3) A description of the efforts the bidder will make to
assure that small business and small disadvantaged business
concerns will have an equitable opportunity to compete for
subcontracts
;
(4) Assurances that the bidder will include the clause en-
titles Utilization of Small Business and Small Disadvantaged
Business Concerns in all subcontracts which offer further sub-
contracting opportunities, and that the bidder will require all
subcontractors (except small business concerns) who receive sub-
contracts in excess of $1,000,000 in the case of a contract for
the construction of any public facility, or in excess of $500,000
in the case of all other contracts, to adopt a plan in conson-
ance with this clause;
(5) Assurances that the bidder will submit such periodic
reports and cooperate in any studies or surveys as may be re-
quired by the contracting agency or the Small Business Admini-
stration in order to determine the extent of compliance by
the bidder with the subcontracting plan; and
(6) A recitation of the types of records the successful
bidder will maintain to demonstrate procedures which have been
adopted to comply with the requirements and goals set forth
in the plan, including the establishment of source lists
of small business concerns and small disadvantaged business
concerns; and efforts to identify and award subcontracts to
such small business concerns.
(b) In order to effectively implement this plan, the contractor
shall:
(1) Issue and promulgate company wide policy statements in
support of this effort, develop written procedures and work in-
structions, and assign specific responsibilities regarding the
requirements of this clause.
(2) Demonstrate continuing management interest and involvement
in support of these programs through such actions as regular
reviews of progress and establishment of overall corporate and
divisional goals and objectives.
(3) Train and motivate contractor personnel in support of
these programs.
(4) Assist small business and small disadvantaged business
concerns by arranging solicitations, time for the preparation
of bids, quantities, specifications, and delivery schedules so as
to facilitate the participation by such concerns. Where the
7-104.14
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Contractor's lists of pote;.r. ».a.i small business and disadvantaged
subcontractors arc executively long, reasonable effort shall be
made to give all such ritual] business concerns as opportunity to
compete over a period of ci/;t< .
(5) Provide adequate a:..: c or;-. I ,- considerationi'of the potential-
ities of small business anJ small disadvantaged business concerns
i in all "make-or-buy" decisions.
(6) Counsel and discus.i subcontracting opportunities with
representatives of small .a .a disadvantaged business firms as are
referred by the Small and L).: .advantaged Business Utilization
Specialist responsible for monitoring performance under this pro-
gram and representatives -r r.he S3A.
(c) The contractor shall jJ^ic DD Foriu 1140-1 in accord-
ance with instructions provided en the form.
(d) The bidder understand chat:
(1) Prior compliance of rr.e bidder with other such subcon-
tracting plans under prevj as contracts will be considered by
the contracting officer in ..--cerinining the responsibility of
the bidder for award of Lht contract.
,
(2) Subcontracting pla.us are noc. required of small
business concerns. '
(3) The failure or au> contractor or subcontractor
to comply in good faith vitn (i) the clause entitled
Utilization of Small Business Concerns and Small Dis-
advantaged Business Concerns, or (ii) the terms of any
subcontracting plan required by this Small Business and
Small Disadvantaged Business SL±>contracting Plan (Ad-
vertised) provision, will be a material breach of the
contract or subcontract.
(End of Clause)
(d) The following clause la an example for use in nego-
tiated contracts in accordance with 1-707. 3(d).
INCENTIVE SUBCONTRACTING PROGRAM FOR SMALL BUSINESS AND
SMALL DISADVANTAGED BUSINESS CONCERNS (1979 JULY)
(1) The contractor has established, in his subcontract-
ing plan, the following goals for awards to small business
and small disadvantag'.-d business concerns:
(I) percent of the total planned sub-
contract amount of $ to small business concerns,
and
(ii) percent of the total planned sub-
contract amount of $ to small business concerns
owned and controlled by socially and economically disadvan-
taged individuals.
(2) In recognition of any extraordinary efforts by the
contractor in exceeding the small business and small dis-
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advantaged bu^ine-,.,
. , r.^aJug goals establish-
ed by (1) ab.-.vu, r; ::..'..,,. Buy, at his election
and in hi^ sole a > .... MWaiJ ice to the contract-




.;_- cuul collar value of all
such subcontract award:, lu excess of each goal in (1) above.
The contracting officer may determine that such excess was
not due to efforts by the contractor, i.e., subcontractor
cost overruns, or where the actual subcontract amount exceeds
that estimated in the subcontract plan; or there were planned
Subcontracts not disclosed in the subcontract plan during
contract negotiation. Determinations under this paragraph
shall not be subject to the clause hereof entitled Disputes.
(3) If the contract is a cosL-plus— fixed-fee type, the
total of the fixed fee and the incentive payments made pur-
suant to this clause is subject to the limitations set forth
in DAH 3-405. 6(c)(2) .
*Exact percentage (not to exceed 10 percent) to be inserted
into the contract document.
(End of Clause)
7-104.15 EjLaminaaon of Records 5v C^mptnAler Central. Insert the follow-
ing clause in all contracts except contracts ioc public utility services at rates not
in excess of those established for uniform applicability to the general public, or at
such rates plus reasonable connection charges incident to such services, or uniess
exempted under 6-704 or 6- I 00 I
EXAMINATION OF RFCORDs BY COMPTROLLER GENERAL (1975 JUN)
(a) This clause is applicaoie if tne amount of oils contract exceeds $10,000 and was entered
into by means of negotiation, including small busmen restricted <*dverusang. but is not applicable
if this contract was entered into by means of formal advertising
(b) The Contractor agrees that the Comptroller General of the United Slates or any of his duly
authorized representatives sfu.ll. until the expiration of three years after final payment under this
contract or such lesser time specified in either Appendix M of the Armed Services Procurement
Regulation or the Federal Procurement Regulations Part 1-20, as appropriate, have access to and
the right to examine any directly pertinent doom jocumena, papers, and records of the Contrac-
tor involving transactions related to tnis contract
(c) The Contractor further agrees to include m all his subcontracts hereunder a provision to
the effect that the subcontractor agrees that the Comptroller General oi the United States or any
o( his duly authorized representatives xnaJI, until tne expiration of three years after fin*J payment
under the subcontract or such lesser time specified m cither Appendu M of the Armed Serv-icea
Procurement Regulation or the Federal Procurement Regulations Pan 1-20, as appropriate, have
access to and the nght to examine any directly perunent boons, documents, papers, and records
of such subcontractor, involving transactions related to the subcontract. The term "subcontract"
as used in this clause excludes 1 1 ) purchase oracrs not exceeding S 1 0.000 and ( u i subcontracts or
purchase orders for public utility services at rates esuDinned for uniform applicability to the
general public.
(d ) The periods of access and examination de-senbed in (b) and (c) above for records which re-
Late to ( i ) appeals under the "Disputes'* clause of this contract, (n) litigation or the settlement of
claims arising out of the performance of this contract, or (in ) costs and expenses of this contract
ms to which exception iias been tai.cn by the Comptroller General or any of his duly authorized
reprcac" adves. shall continue unul such appc~us, LiUfauoo, ciaims or «xacpoom hare been
dfapoacd of
ilmt «rf * l ir)
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CON IKA( I CI AlSl S AND SOLK II VI'ION I'KOV LSIONS
tOLAL OPPORTl'NJTY r*kh tWARl) CLEARANCE OF SI IK ONTkACTS (1971 OCT)
Notwithstanding ir.c- clause of this conn act entitled "Subi ontra^ is." ihe t. onlractor shall not
enter inui a first-lifl subcontract for an estimated or aciual amount
..I II ,000.000 or more
without obtaining in wining trom ihe Contracting Officer a clearance that the proposed subcon
tractor is in compliance with equal opportunity requirements «nd ihereloie is eligible for award
itadol i Uu«. I
7-104.23 Subcontracts
(a) The following cIuumt shall be inserted in all fixed-price type .contracts, in
accoidunce with 23-2UI.
SUbC ONTkACTS (19 7 9 M A I-' )
(The provisions of (his clause do not apply to firm fixed-price contracts and fixed price contract*
with economic price adjustment provisions However, the clauxe di>es apply to unpriced modifica-
tion* under ixich contracts )
(a) As used in this clause, the term "subcontract" in-
cludes but is not limited to purchase orders, changes and/
or modifications thereto.
(b) The Contractor shall notify the Contracting Officer reasonably in advance of entering into
any lubconlrad if the Contiactor's procurement system has not been approved by the Contract
ing Officer and if the subcontract
(i) is to be a cost-reimbursement, time and materials, or labor-hour contract which it is
estimated will involve an amount in excess of twenty— five thousand
dollars ($25,000) including 'any fee:
( n ) is proposed to exceed one hundred thousand dollars ( S lOO.UlK) ). or
(in) is one of a number of subcontracts, under this contract, with a single subcontractor
for the same or related supplies or services which, in the aggregate, are expected to
exceed one hundred thousand dollars ( $ I 00,000 i
(c) The advance notification required by paragraph (b) above shall include
(i) a description of the supplies or ser^^es to be called for by the subcontract.
(n) identification ol the proposed subcontractor and an explanation of why and how the
proposed subcontractor was selected, including (he competition obtained,
(in) the proposed subconrracl price, together with the Contractor's cost or price analysis
thereof,
(iv) the subcontractor's current, complete, and accurate cost or pricing data and Cer
tificatc of Current Coil or I'ricing Data, when such data and certificates are required
by other provisions of this contract to be obtained from the subcontractor,
( v ) identification ol the type of subcontract to be used,
( vi ) a memorandum of negotiation whi^h sets forth (he principal elements of (he subcon
tract price negotiations A copy of this memorandum shall be retained in the conirac
tor's file for the use of Government reviewing authorities The memorandum shall be
in sufficient detail lu reflect the most significant considerations controlling the
establishment of initial or revised prices The memorandum should include an ex-
planation of why cost or pricing data mu, or was not required, and. if K was n >l
required in the ca.->e of an> price negotiation in excess of S 100,000, a statement of
the basis for detcimining thai the price resulted from or was based on adequate price
competition, established catalog 01 market prices of commercial items sold in sub-
stantial quantities to the generai public, or prices set by law or regulation If cost or
pricing data was submitted and a certificate of cost or pricing data was required, the
memorandum shall reflect the extent to which reliance was not placed upon the fac-
tual cost or pricing data submitted and the extern 10 which this data was not used by
the contractor in determining the total price objective and in negotiating the final
price The memorandum shall also reflect the extent to which it was recognized in
the negotiation that any cost or pricing data submitted by the subcontractor was not
accurate, complete, or current, (he action taken by the contractor and the subcon-
tractor as a result, and the effect, if any. of such defective data on the total price
negotiated Where the total price negotiated differs significantly (rom the contrac-
tor's total price objective, the memorandum shall explain this difference,
7-104.23
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( wi ) *licn incentives a.'e used the memorandum of negotiation shall contain in explana-
tion of (he in_enio.c (ec proln plan identifying each critical performance element,
man a^cine nl decisions used to quantity each incentive element, reasons fol incen
lives ot\ particular performance charai lenslics, and a brief summary of trade off pos-
it)ilmci considered is to cost, peiioimancc. and tune, and
Ivni) the Sur«.onirai-toi \ Disclosure Statement u< ( ertificate relating in Cost \ccountmg
Slandaids *hen such Jala aie required hy olhcr provisions ol this ..ontiacl to be ob-
tained from the subcontractor.
Id) the Contra*. tor shall not enier into any subcontract for which advance notification to the
< ontracting Officer is required by this clause, without the prior written consent ol ihe Contract
nig Officer, pruvuieu that the Contracting Officer, in his discretion may ratify in writing any sub-
contract Such ratification shall constitute the consent of the Conti acting Olficet required by this
par agi aph
(e) Neither consent by the Contracting Officer to any sub-
contract or any provisions thereof nor approval of die
Contractor's procurement system shaJl b< construed to bo a
determination; (i) of the acceptability of any subcontract
terms or condition, (ii) of the acceptability of any sub-
contract price or of any amount paid under any subcontract,
or (iii) to relieve the Contractor of any responsibility
lor performing this contract; unless such approval or con-
sent specifically provides otherwise.
if) The Contractor agree* that no subcontract placed under thiv contra t shall provvde for pay-
ment on t cosl-plus-a percentage -of-cosl ha.sis
lent reserves the right to perform contractoi procurement sj.tem reviews *i
( g) The Guvcrnmi
set forth in ASPk Section XXIII
I F.ad of ilium
(b) Insert (he following additional subpatagraph to the clause in (a) above in
accordance wtih 23-20 1 1 1 b )(iii )
(h) Notwi ths tanding approval of the Contractor's procure-
rnent system, the Contractor shall not enter into certain sub-
contracts or classes of subcontracts set forth elsewhere in
this contract without the prior written consent of the Con-
tracting Officer. Wich respect to subcontracts so identified,
the advance notification requirements oi paragraph (b) above
shall be fully applicable even though the Contractor ' s system
lias been approved and those subcontracts are within the scope
of the approval.
7-104.24 Cove-rnmr-nz Property
(a) Government Property Clause Except as provided in (b) through (d) and
(f) below, insert the following clause when a Department is to furnish to the con-
tractor, or the contractor is to acquire Government property
GOVERNMENT PROPERTY iKIXED PRICE) ( l^OH SEP)
(a) Governmtni-Furnuhed Hrvp<ny The Government shall deliver to the Contractor,
for use in
connection with and under the terms of this contract, the property described a*
Government-
furnished property in the Schedule or specifications, together with such related
data and informa-
tion as the Contractor may request and as may reasonably be requned lor the
intended use of
7-104.24
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CON IK AC 1 ri.UMiS A,NI> SOl.UTI A I ION l'KO\ IS IONS
.Is 1
1'
lit wall tins v . nit i ,u 1 , nit. hk In i r demand . Ollscijlli ill ii} i kin ill , i i mi ii. ilii hi, | in | I Ik , I ilc t) l
tl.lllMllllt.il l>\ llu ClOVel IllllCllt In I I II 1 i Hill u. till lit .1 |.i . 1 1 is. 1 1 lipplelllelll.il agrCCIIICIll 1 1 I i i HI
I II III Completed III. g( lll.lt li 111 . Iimiii; I III .11 II i UII 1 1 . HI llv ) 1 1 tills I I Mil I .it p[ir. l.les I Hi II V I SI I ill (il
(iiu.s, itn.- date ni '.villi, ii m m ii. i- tu ilu ( .inn. i. iiii anting ilu: .hi M >i u 1 1 nl r i.t ii ml payable in loii
net lion \-.iili .i pricing pioposal 01 in conn cet ion with .1 negotiated piuing agreement mil mi
1 11 med hy 1 mill .u 1 supplement
I t ml i.l 1 Luis.-
,
Ilu; mil' 1 est 1 ales established hy ill*. 1 Scctclaiy, ol llu - ! icasut v, will Wc published in
the I'edcral Rcytslci l'.i.'i, si\ uuuilhs I lit current rate .nay also be obtained
1 1 1 -in 1 he I )(. p. 11 1 1 in. nt .1! t. 1 iiii rai. I I 1 11. 1 ik 1 t >l 1 ii. i icpi esc nt alive
7 104.40 Cinnpt'tititui in Sitbenntrtu'tiny,. I lie following clause shall he in-
cluded in .ill negotiated eontincts ovei £10,DUO, except in firm fixcd-piiec eon
liacts where award is on the basis ot effective pi ie«. competition oi where prices
.ne established hy law 01 regulation
( (IMI'1. ITMON IN SlUK ON I KM I INC 1 l'»«>2 M'Ui
I lie Contractor shall select suliciiiui actors 1 including suppliers) on a competitive bras 10 the
maximum 1 1 1. ie lical extent v onsislcilt with the objectives ami requirements of I he contract
it ml .,1 i'Uium-I
7 104.4 1 luilit hy Department t>J Dejen.se
1 .1 ) Insert the following clause in .ill coiitiacts (except those entered into by
formal advertising which are not expected to exceed $ 1 1)0,1)1)0).
At Oil UY DKI'AKI Ml N I Ol-OlvH-.N.M- I l')7H AM.)
t .1 ) lifnerul I lie Com 1 acting ( H'ficei 01 Ins representatives shall have the audit and ins pec lion
rights deset ibed in the applicable pnrngiaphs ihi. (c ) uul (ill below
(b) E.\ammalum <>j C</vf.< U tins is a cost reimbursement type, incentive, time and nialenals,
labor limir. or puce icdcle t unliable contract, in .nr, coinhinatioii theicol, the Contractor shall
maiiilain. .uul ihc Contracting Officer 111 his repiesentatives sh.ill have the right to examine
bonks, records, documents, and oiiiet evidence and accounting procedures ami practices, suffi-
cient to rellect properly ..II direct and indirect costs ol whatever n.itiue claimed to have In en in
curred and anticipated to he incurred lor the performance ol tins contract Such right ol ex. in una
lion shall include inspection at all reasonable turns .a ihc Contractor's plants, or such parts
theicol, as may be engaged m the pel loi malice ol llus eoiiliacl
( c ) ( Hi 1 nr I'm mi; I >uiii If the t ontracioi submitted e o* 1 nr puling data m connection w iih the
piicmg ul this contract 01 any change or modification thereto, unless such piicing was based on
adequate pi ice competition , established catalog 01 m.u kcl prices of commercial items sold in sub
slant ial quantities to ihe gv nei a I public. 01 pi ices sei bv law .n legulation, the Contracting I )t ticei
nr his representatives who ire employees of ihc t hull .1 State . < ioveinmcnt shall have the 1 ight to
examine all hooks, records, documents and other data ol the C 1 infractor related 10 the negotia-
tion, pricing or perfoi malice ol mi. I. com 1 act, change m inothlii at ion, lor the purpose ol e valual-
ing the accuracy, completeness uul cm 1 em. y ol tin 1 osl 01 pi ii mg data submitted Additionally,
in the ...isc of pi icing .no change or modification exceeding % lOO.UOO to formally advei used con
tracts, the Comptroller Cieneral ot the United States nr Ins representatives who .ire employees of
tin- I allied Slates (jov eminent shall have si. eh rights I lie 1 ighl ol examination shall extend to .ill
documents necessary to permit adequate .valuation ol tin vnsi nr pricing data submitted, along
with the compulations and projections used therein
(d) Reports II the Contractoi is required to furnish Contractor Cosi Data Reports (CCl)K),
Conn act l-und Status Kepoils (CI SK ). or Cost l»erloi malice Reports (( I 'K ) the Contracting < >!
7- 104.41
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tiaet i. 'i I., icquuc icpuynioiil ol ,ui> fixed let- tlicrelnlore pant) in such amount as may be
equitable iindci I Ik kilcuiliMaiii.CN, "i I in i may Ic I inmate I Ills contract I'ur dclaull as provide.! Ill
llic cluu.se "I tin- c.iiiliucl culillcd lciiuiii.il I allure In agree In llie am. mill ol any such in
e i case 1 1 . i is I In he . 1 1. 1 1 Lie 1 1 in I tie * null acini , h [u Midi ic.luclnm in, . >r repay incut of, the tixed
lee .hall he a di-.pule i-i nicci nmu a question ol lad v. ilhiii the meaning nl the clause ol I his coii-
II a. l . milled ' I )i put. s
l. i Notwithstanding the pmvisimis ..I paiagiaph ibt hereof, the (ioveriuneill may at any tune
icquire I lie em ice 1 1> hi "i replacement l>\ I lie i ontiucttir, w ulun.it cost to the Government, ot sup
plies ul lots nl supplies w hieh aie detective in m.iiei i.il ol woi kmanship, or otherwise not in eon
toi mily with the i ciiuil cine nl s nl this . onli ael il -m 1 1 lie I eels oi lailuies are due to fraud, lack ol
l'oo.I |.i i ih oi 'A 1 1 II nl m ise om In. I mi the p.u I • 'I .mv nl the ( out i j. lor s directors or officers, or on
the pari ol any ol his manage!., superintendents, nl olhci equivalent representatives., who has mi
pel visum oi .In ce in hi nl t i I all m suhslanlially .ill i il l he C"out i actor's business, or ( u ) all or sub
sianlially all ol the < onlraclor's operations ai an> one plant or separate location in which this
eouiiaci is being peiioinied m I lit i a separate and complete major industrial operation in con-
nect mil with I he pel 1 1 ii inane e ol ilns contract I he (.iovei nuieiil may a I any time also require cor-
rection oi replacemen I by the i on true lor, without eosi to the (iovernmenl, of any such defective
supplies or lots nl supplies il the defects, or failures are caused by one or more individual em-
ployees ^elected oi retained hy the ( nnlractm alter any sueh supervisory personnel has reasona-
ble grounds in believe that such employee is habitually careless or otherwise unqualified
I d I <. nriceted supplies or replaced supplies shall be subject to the provisions ol this clause in
the same manner and to the same extent as supplies originally delivered under this contract
(e) I he t 'nulla. (or shall make his records ol all inspection work available to the Government
dining the performance of this contract and tin such longer period as may be specified in this
contract
(!) Lxcepl as provided in this clause and as may be provided in the Schedule, the Contractor
shall have no obligation or liability to correct oi replace supplies or lots of supplies which at the
lime ol deliveiy ale defective ill material or workmanship or otherwise not in conformity with the
requirements nl this contract.
(g) 1 \cepl as otherwise prnvided ill the Schedule, the Contractor's obligation to correct or
replace (iovei nuieiil furnished property (which is pmpeily in the possession ol or acquired
directly by the (iovernmenl and delivered or otherwise made available to the Contractor) shall be
gnverned by the provisions ol t ho clause ol this contract eniiiled "Government Property".
it nil nl cImu.sc)
(b) When it is desired to require contractors to maintain an inspection
system in accordance with Military Specification Mil -1-45208 (see 14-303), the
clause in (a) above shall be inserted in the contract except that the following shall
be added as the third sentence of paragraph (a).
I he inspection syslem shall he in accordance with ihe edition i^t' Military Specification Mil -
I 452t)« in eltcct on the date ol this contract ( I 4n7 \UG)
7-203.6 Assignment of Claims. In accordance with 7-103.8, insert the clause
therein
7-203.7 Examination of Records hy Comptroller General. In accordance with
7-104.15, insert the clause therein.
7-203.8 Subcontracts.
(a) In accordance with 23-201 2, and subject to the instructions in (b)
below, insert the following clause.
7-203.8
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SUHCONTKACTS ( I «>7*i M..M-; )
(a) The Contractor shall notify the Contracting Officer
reasonably in advance of entering into any subcontract (as
used in this clause, the term "subcontract" includes, but
is not limited to, purchase orders, changes, and/or modi-
fications thereto) which (i) is cost-reimbursement type,
time and materials or labor-hour, or ( 1 i ,) is fixed-price
type and exceeds in dollar amount either $25,000 or five
percent (5%) of tin. Local estimated cost of th is . contract
,
or (iii) provides for the fabrication, purchase, rental,
installation, or other acquisition of special test equip-
ment having a value in excess of $1,000 or of any items
of industrial facilities.
(b) In the case of a proposed subcontract, including but
nut limited to purchase orders, changes, and/or modifica-
tions thereto) which (i) is cost-reimbursement type, time
and materials, or labor-hour, and would involve an estimat-
ed amount in excess oi $10,000, including any fee, or (ii)
is proposed to exceed $100,000, or (iii) is one of a number
of subcontracts under this contract with a single subcon-
tractor for the same or related supplies or services which,
in the aggregate are expected to exceed $100,000; the
advance notification required by (a) above shall include:
( I ) a description of the supplies or service u> be called lor by trie subcontract.
(2) identification of the proposed subcontractor and an explanation of why and how the
proposed subcontractor was selected inc lulling the degi ee of competition obtained,
(3) the picps'sed subcontract price, together with the Contractor's cost or pnee analysis
thereof
(4) the subcontractor's current, complete, and accurate cost or pricing data and Cer-
tificate of Current Cost or Pricing Data, *hcn such lata nn\ certificate are required,
by other provisions of this contract, to be obtained fiom the subcontractor,
( 5 ) identific ation ol the type of subcontract to be used
.
(6) a rncmoiandum of negotiation which sets forth the principal elements of the subcon-
tract price negotiations A copy of this memorandum shall be retained in the contrac-
tor's file for the use of Covernment reviewing authorities The memorandum shall be
in sufficient detail to reflect the most significant considerations controlling the
establishment of initial or revised prices The memorandum should include an ex-
planalion of why cost or pricing data was, or wai not required, and. il it was not
required in the case of any price negotiation in excess of Sl(X).f)O0. a statement of
the basis for determining that the price resulted from or was based on adequate prv.e
competition, established catalog or market prices of commercial items sold in sub-
stantial quantities to the general public, or prices set by law or regulation. If cost or
pricing data was submitted and a certificate of cost 01 pricing data was required, the
memorandum shall reflect the extent to which reliance was not placed upon the fac-
tual cost or pricing data submitted and the extent to which this data was not used by
the contractor in determining the total puce objective and in negotiating the final
puce The memorandum shall also reflect the extent lo which il was recognized in
the negotiation thai any cost or pricing data submitted by the subcontractor was not
accurate, complete, or current, the action tak.cn by the contractor and the subcon-
tractor as a result, and (he effect, if any, of such defective data on the total price
negotiated Where the total price negotiated differs significantly from the Contrac-
tor's total price objective, the memorandum shall explain this difference.
7-203.8




CONTRACT CLAUSES ANP SOLICITATION PROVISIONS
i "M when incentives arc used, the ntinnfjndum i>l r.egolialion shall Limiain an explain
turn i)l the incentive fee/profit plan idenul>.ng each .iitn.il performance eleniem,
management decisions used I" juanlils each incentive element, realms foi mceii
lives on parncuiai pertor marice eharat irn tics, and a btiel lummifj ol trade off pos-
sibilities considered as to cost, perform.! e. an I in.ir ami
(8) the subcontractor':, Disclosure Statement 01 <. crtificate relating lo ( ost Accounting
Standards when such Jala a>e .cu.uired hy .ther provision-, ol 'his contract lo be oh
tamed ffotn the subcontracloi
(c) I he Contractor si < u! I obtain the w i men Consent ol the r onl railing I Xfic er pnoi to placing'
any subcontract for which advance notification is requited undei (a) .it-ike I he c onlractmg (Of-
ficer m.y, in his discretion, ratify in writing any such subcontra. I su i. action shall consiiluie Ihe
consent ol the Contracting Otlicer as .cqu.icj h\ this paragraph it i
(d) The Contractor agrees that no subcontract placed .nidct this conlrai i shall provide for pay-
ment on a cost plus a pert onlage-of -cost basis
(e) Neither consent by the Contracting Officer to any sub-
contract or any provisions thereof nor approval of the
Contractor's procurement system shall he construed Co he a
de Ll-riii i nut ion
;
(i) of the acceptability of any subcontract
Cemis or condition, (ii) of the acceptability of any sub-
contract price or of any amount paid under any subcontract,
or (iii) to relieve the Contractor ol any responsibility
for performing this contract; unless such approval or
consent specifically provides otherwise.
(f) The Contractor shall give (he Conlracnng Officer immediate notice in witting of any action
Of tuit filed, and prompt notice of any claim made against ihe Coniractor by any subcontractor or
»endor which, in ihe opinion of the t ontraCtor, mas lesuli in litigation, related in any way to this
contract with respcel 10 which ihe Contractor may be entitled to teimhur enieni from the
Government
(g) Notwithstanding (ci above, ihe Contractor may enter into subcontracts wiihin Ii) and ( n I
of (a) above without ihe consent of ihe Contracting Officer if the Contracting Officer hecs ap-
proved in writing the Contractor's procurement syslem and ihe subcontract is within the scope of
the approval (This subparagraph (gi however, shall noi be applicable to those subcontracts sub-
ject to subparagraph (k) below, if any.)
(h) The Contractor shall ( i ) insert in each incentive
price revision or price redetermination subcontract here-
under the substance of the "Limitation on Payments" para-
graph set forth in the appropriate clause prescribed by
paragraph 7-108 or 7-109 of the Armed Services Procurement
Regulation, including subparagraph (4) thereof, modified to
omit mention of the Government and reflect the position of
the Contractor as purchaser and of the subcontractor as
vendor, and to omit that portion of subparagraph (3) there-
of relating to tax credits, and (ii) include in each cost-
reimbursement type subcontract hereunder a requirement that
each price redetermination and incentive price revision
subcontract thereunder will contain the substance of the
"Limitation on Payments" provision, including subparagraph
(A) thereof, modified as outlined in (i) above.
7-203.8




contuaci' ui.ah.sks Arm solicitation I'Kovl^ions
i,i f o L.iliui. small husinesi paNn i;...i i. ,r. .1 .if- oiuraciir.|< under Hun LOHiract, the i i.ntrac
U.I « h ire% U. |ii.mJc |ii^pt^ |>j>n,r..! 01 if,,' fi »ol pi •.. r ill.. .;iil 1 ai Is of (liuse Mibfoiil r a< l.'f
«l,uh jic Miuil [iiiMnt.- Min..t!iu, in , nl.rrnii, * i!li '.I r Maiulaf.l for usls-maf) pruyie •' (••»'
uterus slaied u, paragraphs Si)i and M •» oi ^pi-ciuJi. I ..I ihc Mined Vi.Kf- Procuicn.cni
Keglllalion, is in ctie , I onir.. dale ..I : I.. Loniiavl ! >>< > ,.,i.Mm, l„nhri ^i,-c- lluMUr uec
'
f. . Mi.h j roprev pa>(licnl< * ill riot Ur 1 iii-.idcir ' a a I. .in !;.-aj 01 ail. cot IjeiOT 111 ihe a* art) ol
i»uh< 1 hi- f as i
'
III I he < iiivernn.ci 1 ic\n-^ ihc ngni lo ps.-fio.-ni ^'i.u^^i
XI tonn .n |;."iK Sij-oc LOU XX l". 1 i .
t - j «r rliuxi
•
-jiiren.eni s , ,lcm r<
( b I Insert the follow trig additional subparagraph to the clause in ' a ) abo^c in
accordance *'ith 23-201 2(d)
(k) Nouwi ths tand Lng approval of the Contractor's procure-
ment system, the- Contractor shall not enter into certain
subcontract:, or classes of subcontracts set forth elsewhere
in this contract without the prior written consent of the
Contracting Officer. With respect to subcontracts so identi-
fied, the advance notification requirements of paragraph (a)
above shall be fully applicable even though the Contractor's
procurement system has been approved and those subcontracts
are within the scope of the approval.
(c) In contracts with educational institutions, change
"(iii)" in paragraph (a) of the clause in (a) above to read:
(iii) provides for the fabrication, purchase, rental,
installation, or other acquisition of equipment
or of industrial facil ities
.
(1975 OCT)
(J) In accordance with 23-20 1 4 inser! the E-qual Opportunity Pre-V*ard
Clearance of Subcontracts clause in 7-104 2 2
7-203.') l :iilizutuiii of Smu'l Husi/uss Concerns In accordance with
1-70" 3t a i and t b ), insert one in K>th ol the clan no, in 7- 1 04 14
7-203.10 lerminaiwn In accordance with 8-702(a), insert the following
clau>e
Tt- kMIN vTldS ( ts»7J \I'H,
i a I " v ;icri\'f rtidnee iii *orV unJer ihc ^ontrau iiu\ be lernn uied b> .he Cuvernrrii-ni in ji
c irJaiive *i(n ihi.\ elaux in * nolc. .u from imie in nmc ui pin
iii *henocr ;hr i ntraiior shall .ieUuli in pcrtoi ir.ance • ! this l >nira..i in accordance
i*ilh us icim.% , including in ihc let 11 default mj .u^'i lailurg hs ihe C oniraclot lo
rn.ikc progrco in :he fro>ev mon nl ihc w.nd. hercundci as endangers such pei
Uirmaneel. jnJ snail lail to i !,ic «Kh l.-iauli *itnin a period of ten diss (01 sot h
lunger periods, j, ihc Contracting ( Mlicei mas, all. * i alier receipt from ihc (.'onirael-
in ^ i IfflcCl ol j notice specifying die default, or
7-203.10
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7-2003.73 Solicitation Provision for Dismantling, Demolition or Removal of
improvements. In accordance with 4-503, insert the following provision for sol-
icitations for dismantling, demolition or removal of improvements.
•ONDS OR OTHER SECURITY (1977 APR)
A Oui guarantee in Lhe penj sum of J. mutt accompany the bid. Within ten ( 10) days after
raccipt of nouce of award, the Contractor shall fumuh a performance bond (Standard Form
IS ) in the penal mm of S and payment, in full, of any iuri due the Government. The bond of
any surety company holding a certificate of authority from the Secretary of the Treasury aa an ac
ceptaole surety on Federal bond* will b< accepted. Individual mrcuei will be accepted if each
auch surety deposits with the Contracting Officer cash, bonds, or note* of the United States, or
certified check drawn to the order of the office designated for contract administration, or such
other KCuritY ai the Contracting Officer may deem necessary, for the required amount of the
guaranty, under the agreement that the collateral »o deposited shall remain in the poasesaion and
control uf the Treasurer of the United States until the completion of the contract The formal
contract and notice to proceed will be issued on receipt of an accepuble performance bond and
payment of any sum due the Government
(£*4 at prrmmoa\
7-2003.74 Small Disadvantaged Business Concern. Include
the following representation in accordance with 1-707. 3(e).
SMALL DISADVANTAGED BUSINESS CONCERN (1979 JULY)
(a) The offeror represents 'that he ( ) is, ( ) is not,
a small business concern owned and controlled by socially
and economically disadvantaged individuals. The term
"small business concern" means a small business as defined
pursuant to Section 3 of the Small Business Act and rele-
vant regulations promulgated pursuant thereto. The term
"small business concern owned and controlled by socially
and economically disadvantaged individuals" means a small
business concern
—
(1) that is at least 51 per centum owned by one or more
socially and economically disadvantaged individuals; or,
in the case of any publicly owned business, at least 51
per centum of the stock of which is owned by one or more
socially or economically disadvantaged individuals; and
(2) whose management and daily business operations are
controlled by one or more such individuals.
(b) The offeror shall presume that socially and economi-
cally disadvantaged individuals include Black. Americans,
Hispanic Americans, Native Americans (such as American
Indians, Eskimos, Aleuts, and native Hawaiians) , and other
minorities or any other individuals found to be disadvan-
taged by the Small Business Administration pursuant to
Section 8(a) of the Small Business Act.
(End)
7-2003.74




an analysis of source development actions that resulted from this
activity.
40. Adequate Price Competition :
a. The most acceptable and reasonable price is obtained
when adequate price competition exists, since contracts can then
generally be awarded to the lowest bidder without further price/cost
analysis. But several criteria must be met before the buyer can be
assured that he has adequate price competition as indicated in ASPR
3-807. First, an adequate number of responsible offerors must
submit bids. There is no magic number, however, a minimum of
two offerors is required, but three, four or more may be necessary.
The actual number to solicit must be the buyer's decision, made after
he has considered all facets of the particular procurement, And of
course he must solicit only qualified vendors, adding to the source
list only those who have a capability in the particular product field.
(1) A second criterion for adequate price competition is
that the potential vendors must be able to satisfy the contractor's
requirements. They should not be quoting merely to remain on the
contractor's source list or because a willingness to quote on the current
requirement might be looked on favorably in the award of future business,
(2) A third criterion for competition is that the vendors
must independently contend for the contract to be awarded to the respon-
sive and responsible offeror submitting the lowest evaluated price.
(3) The fourth criterion is that the vendors must submit
priced offers responsive to the expressed requirements of the solicita-
tion. The work statements and referenced specifications must be com-
plete and easily understood by the vendors; otherwise, the vendors will
base their quotations on their own interpretations of the work require-
ments. Of course, the buyer cannot always tell whether or not vendors
do, in fact, understand, but he can provide them with the opportunity
to discuss the work statement with the person or group who developed
it. One indication of whether the work statement is gomplete and under-
standable is the closeness of the various quotations. A wide variation
in quoted prices may be a warning to the buyer not to place the contract




(4) The above criteria lor adequate price competition
should be met whenever contracts are to be awarded to the lowest
bidder without additional price/cost analysis. Whether there is
pri< e competition tor a given procurement is a matter of judgment to
b<.- based on an evaluation of whether each of the f(jregoing conditions
have been satisfied. Gene rally, in making this judgment the smaller
number oi otierors, the greater the need for close evaluation.
(5) Even though all the criteria for adequate price competi-
tion may not be- present -- if, for example, the specifications cannot
be made completely definitive -- the buyer should still obtain several
quotations, if it is practicable and feasible for him to do so. In these
cases, however, he cannot be sure that the lowest price is reasonable
--and he must undertake some form of price/cost analysis. His anal-
ysis-may be nothing more than a simple review of price history for
the same or similar product. Or, it may be an intensive analysis of
every cost element of the vendor's quotation, coupled with an independ-
ent m-house estimate. The intensiveness of the analysis he makes
depends on several factors, including the dollar amount involved in the
procurement, the degree of competition present, his past experience
with the vendor, the complexity of the item, and so on.
(o i If a vendor has received several successive production
contracts for a part having a specific design, effective competition on
subsequent procurement may not be possible. If, for example, the
tooling is owned by the vendor, competition may be precluded because
other vendors' would have to include expensive tooling charges in their
quotations. But this is not always the case, and buyers sometimes
change suppliers of specially designed parts after several follow-on
contracts. It should be kept in mind that competitive bidding may be
an effective way to keep a vendor working toward even greater effi-
ciency. It also serves to eliminate the possibility that a single source
may exploit his position by forcing unreasonable prices and other con-
cessions from the buyer. Moreover, through competitive bidding an
alternate source may be discovered who, through some technical or
manufacturing break-through, can perform more satisfactorily than
the existing source.
(7) The buyer should always use judgement in determing
the number of sources to solicit; however, in no case should he request




5oare.es being solicited. This paragraph of the report should contain
statistics on the procurements examined in accordance with the format
in Attachment 4, Statistical Information.
b. Review and evaluation. The contractor's attitude toward
the placement of contracts on a competitive basis and his actual practice
in this regard can be determined from his policies and procedures, the
purchase -order samples, and cognizant procurement personnel.
(1) His policies and procedures should state the circum-
stances under which an award may be made to the lowest responsive
bidder without further price/cost analysis and those under which further
analysis should be made even though competitive bids have been obtained.
(Z) The purchase -orde r samples will show how the policies
and procedures are being applied. From the samples, the review team
can determine the percentage of procurements on which competitive
quotations were obtained. The samples will also reveal the average
number of bids received on competitively bid procurements; this is a
measure of the "depth" of competition.
(3) The purchase -order samples should be reviewed to
determine whether or not the contractor is actually getting adequate
and effective competition in those instances when orders are placed
with the lowest bidder. Review of the reports on vendor capability,
discussion with buying personnel, and its own knowledge of vendors
should help the review team to determine whether an adequate number
of qualified vendors has submitted quotations on any one particular
purchase order. How active the vendors were in seeking the business
may be determined from a review of past prices paid for the same or
similar product and from discussions with the cognizant buyer. Whether
the work statement is complete and has been understood can be deter-
mined by the closeness of the quotations. If two or three low quotations
are relatively close together, it may mean that the work statement
is well defined and that the bidders are all quoting with the same under-
standing of the requirement.
(4) In the case of purchase-order samples, where competi-
tion was not sought -- that is, if the source solicited was a single or
sole source -- the file documentation should be reviewed to see whether
the lack of competition is justified. When an order is placed with




cation for the award.
(5) [n its report, the review team should discuss whether
.the contractor solicits competitive quotations whenever competition
is feasible -- as indicated by the nature of the procurement, the lead
time, the availability of qualified sources, and so forth. The review
report should also show the depth of competition, that is, whether or
not the number of bidders is sufficient. In addition, it should discuss
whether price/cost analysis was performed in instances where award
was made to the lowest bidder but where the review team had reason
to doubt that adequate and effective competition was, in fact, obtained.
41 . Single -Sole -Source Procurement - Second Source Development :
a. Identifying competitive potential. Materials management
has the responsibility for establishing buyer discipline in seeking
second sources. Buyers must be competition oriented. Too often,
procurement files reflect that Company A is the only source when in
actuality a little more effort on the buyer's part might have resulted
in obtaining good competitive quotes. It is recognized that a single
source which has been furnishing an item for several years may have
the edge when the item is up for consideration. However, the threat
of competition may have a salutary effect, and result in a single/sole-
source supplier reducing his price. Unless the materials' manager
takes a hard look at his noncompetitive procurements and endeavors
to compete them, there can be little assurance to the Government that
the price being paid is fair and reasonable.
b. Procurement should have a continual program to review
and categorize existing single / sole - sour ce inventory and line items.
An item-by-item review of significant dollar purchases should be made
and recorded as subject to competition, or not subject to competition.
The results of this item review can be grouped into three categories:
(1) Those items which can and will be completed.
(2) Those items which definitely cannot be competed, for
sound reasons (such as configuration control, program too limited to
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